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
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
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CUBAN SUPPORT TO LATIN AMERICAN  
AND CARIBBEAN INSURGENCIES: 1978-1983

by

Susan Hartley Butler

September 1985

Thesis Advisor:

Jiri Valenta

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microstates. Cuban techniques for promoting wars of national liberation, with minimal risk and cost to the Castro regime, are discussed. Areas in which Cuban and Soviet objectives have diverged are noted to show that Cuban aggression in the region is directed primarily against the United States, and not necessarily tailored to meet Soviet goals.

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the historical and ideological foundations of Cuban involvement with other Communist and insurgent movements throughout Central America and the Caribbean. The thesis focuses on the period 1978 to 1983, and includes analyses of Cuban relations with groups in and out of power in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, Grenada, and other Caribbean microstates. Cuban techniques for promoting wars of national liberation, with minimal risk and cost to the Castro regime, are discussed. Areas in which Cuban and Soviet objectives have diverged are noted to show that Cuban aggression in the region is directed primarily against the United States, and not necessarily tailored to meet Soviet goals.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1959, the Marxist regime in Cuba has been the focus of much debate, especially in regard to its relation with its patron, the Soviet Union, and its activities in the Third World. Many see Cuba as merely a Soviet surrogate, and there seems to be much evidence to support this view. An intelligence report from an unidentified Western ally, estimated that Soviet economic aid to Cuba in 1982 was approximately \$11 million per day, which is equivalent to over \$1 per day for each of the island's 9.7 million residents [Ref. 1]. A Rand analysis estimated that by June 1983, the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union exceeded \$9 billion in soft currency loans. The analysis concluded that the continuation of Soviet aid was contingent on Cuban intervention in the Third World. [Ref. 2:pp. 2-19]

This kind of conclusion negates the existence of an independent Cuban foreign policy. Soviet recognition of Cuban interventionism is a strong motivator, but it is not the only rationale behind the foreign policy decisions of Fidel Castro Ruiz. This thesis will explore those motivations by an historical study of Cuban support to insurgent groups and other Marxist governments in Latin America, particularly in the latest Cuban revolutionary offensive between 1978 and 1983.

Taken in the larger context of Cuban actions since the 1959 revolution, the hypothesis is that the current phase of Cuban docility is a reaction to what it perceives as an unfavorable "correlation of forces" in the Western Hemisphere, and though Fidel is currently avoiding any activity that may evoke the wrath of the Reagan administration, the ideology behind Cuban adventurism in Latin America has not changed. Even the Soviets find it difficult to influence Fidel once he has made up his mind to pursue policy in a particular way. Although his current caution, particularly in regard to Nicaragua, may bring him disfavor in the eyes of Moscow [Ref. 3], his first priority is the survival of the Cuban State. To ensure this survival he will need to minimize the losses imposed by the actions of the Reagan administration, which necessitates either terminating subversive operations or moving them further underground.

Finally the thesis will show that although Fidel has always been the charismatic leader behind Cuban foreign policy, that policy has been a result of a unique Cuban political culture. Even after Fidel departs from office, Cuban relations with Latin America, the United States, and the Soviet Union essentially will remain unchanged. If anything, they will become cloaked in even more obscurity than in the past. Cuban efforts to destabilize the region will become more calculated to appease the Soviets by

expanding Communist influence without alerting the United States as to its origin. The idealistic Cuban revolutionary of the 1960's has already been replaced with a more pragmatic, cold-blooded, and realistic brand of revolutionary -- one that is willing and able to utilize terror and deception to accomplish his ends. Hence it is important at this time to be fully cognizant of the ideology and other forces that drive the Cubans, as well as to be aware of the methods that they employ. Only by doing so will the United States be able to adopt the foreign policy initiatives necessary to counter their efforts.

## II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Cuba's strategic role in Latin America dates back through its four centuries of Spanish rule. Discovered by Columbus on his first voyage to the new world, by the early 1500's the island was being used as a launch point for further Spanish expeditions into the rest of the Americas. As it possessed none of the silver and gold so sought after by the *conquistadores*, settlements on the island remained small, and were administered by the Catholic Church. The Church's rule did little to alleviate the harsh conditions endured by the island's residents, which included an indigenous native population, and a growing number of black slaves from Africa. All were treated with relatively equal disdain as the clergy expanded its wealth and power. As a result of these conditions, and relatively informal emancipation policies, whites, blacks, and Indians integrated themselves into a nation unique among the remaining settlements in Latin America. [Ref. 4:pp. 15, 34-37]

Despite this strong cultural bond, the desire for independence from Spain emerged slowly. The growth of sugar and coffee industries and the development of trade with the United States in the early 1800's resulted in a gradual, though uneven, increase in prosperity for the island's

populus. As Spain found herself being forcibly ejected from her other new world colonies, many Spanish royalists and troops resettled in Cuba, in effect, making the island the last stronghold of colonial strength. By mid-century only Puerto Rico and Cuba remained under Spanish rule.

Disaffection with crown rule grew more as a result of a romantic notion of joining the struggles for independence throughout the rest of the Americas, than by a desperate need to escape an intolerable situation of bondage.

[Ref. 4:pp. 75-77]

The fight for independence from Spain left Cuba a legacy that eventually brought about Castro's revolution as well as the form and content of Cuban-Latin American relations today. The struggle was long and arduous -- spanning 30 years -- and facing the entire might of the Spanish crown. Cubans were forced to transcend regional differences and fight a guerrilla war in the hope of wearing down Spanish resolve. Anti-United States sentiment developed as President Ulysses S. Grant declared a policy of neutrality and refused to recognize or send assistance to the rebels. As Cuban sugar production fell due to the fighting and the abolition of slavery, the United States rushed in to purchase the crops at depressed prices. This convinced most Cubans that independence from Spain should not be synonymous with dependence on the United States. [Ref. 4:pp. 82-84]

The main proponent of this view, and the eventual martyr of the war for independence, was Jose Marti, a poet educated in Spain and well-traveled throughout the Americas. Marti admired the United States, but was disillusioned with the monopolistic and protectionist policies. Marti held that the role of government was to provide for the development of the people through equitable land distribution, and to keep the state economy independent of any one market. Most important was his idealistic notion of the eventual union of all Latin American States, as a means of preventing domination by imperialistic powers. [Ref. 4:pp. 85-88] In Nuestra Razon, the 1956 Manifesto-Program of the 26 of July Movement, Marti is identified as the "ideological source" of the revolutionary movement [Ref. 5:p. 275]

The U.S intervention in 1898, the Platt Amendment in 1902, and the ensuing U.S. domination of the sugar market confirmed Cuba's worst fears. The growing anti-imperialist consensus among the intellectual segments of Cuban society was exacerbated by the repressive tactics of Gerardo Machado, who was regarded as a U.S. puppet. The 1933 revolution was an attempt by moderate elements to restore a modicum of independence to Cuba. Its failure to break free of U.S. domination was proof to the younger, more radical generation of Cubans that more drastic measures were

required, and set the stage for Castro's revolution and his dependence on the Soviet Union. [Ref. 6:pp. 54-60]

Thus, it should be reiterated that the Cuban notion of its position in the Americas and its antagonistic relations with the United States are not entirely due to the personal ambitions of Fidel Castro. Cuba's strategic role is a result of a romantic notion of Latin American independence, a racial mix conducive to close relations with other radicalized Third World States, and a 100-year long anti-U.S. sentiment. It was Fidel Castro, however, that provided the charismatic leadership and the catalyst to bring these latent elements to the surface.

Fidel's early years as a student activist are still a subject of much debate. In Red Star over Cuba, Nathaniel Jeyl cites Colombian National Police reports as evidence that in 1948 Fidel was a Soviet agent and helped to orchestrate the murder of Colombian moderate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan and the subsequent rioting in Bogotá [Ref. 7: pp. 35-36]. Fidel was also a member of the abortive *Cayo Confites* Caribbean Legion expedition to liberate the Dominican Republic in 1947. The conspiracy appears to have had at least the tacit support of the Cuban government, and its members were trained by Communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The following year, back at the University of Havana, Fidel was accused, but not convicted, of the shooting deaths of a rival student activist and a

policeman. [Ref. 7:pp. 61-72] Whether these accusations are true will always be a matter of speculation; nevertheless it has certainly contributed to Fidel's notoriety among the radical left as an impassioned revolutionary.

The story of the Castro's revolution will not be retold here. Suffice it to say that the experiences undergone by the *fidelistas* to achieve power provided a twofold legacy to Cuba: an ideology, Castroism, that differed from Marxism-Leninism and Maoism; and an operational strategy, the guerrilla-*foco* theory, that prescribed the successful conduct of revolution. The application of these theories to the rest of Latin America was first described by Che Guevara in a speech to the *Nuestro Tiempo* Association in Havana on January 27, 1959 [Ref. 8:pp. 39-43]. Revolution could be achieved by strength of will and determination, despite unfavorable political, economic, and military conditions. The strategy advocated armed struggle by a revolutionary vanguard composed of intellectuals rather than members of the urban proletariat. The struggle would be primarily in the countryside, with the guerrillas operating from a secure base of peasant support, the *foco*. Revolutionary elements in the cities would only be used to provide logistic and ideological support to the rural struggle. Upon victory, the guerrilla elite would have absolute power to ensure that the new regime would not be weakened by moderate or reactionary forces. [Ref. 6:pp. 106-07] Fidel himself



reiterated the inevitability of revolution and concentrated on the anti-U.S. character of the struggle in his "Second Declaration of Havana" on February 4, 1962. He stated, that in the face of severe repression,

. . . it is neither just nor correct to divert the peoples with the vain and accomodating illusion that it is or will be possible to uproot the dominant classes by legal means. [Ref. 9]

Castroism differed from Marxist-Leninist thought primarily in its classless nature, as well as in its advocacy of armed struggle. At the time of Castro's ascent to power, there were pro-Soviet Communist Parties in every Latin American state except Panama, most of whom accepted Soviet guidance and advice on international and domestic affairs without question. This included a preference for achieving power in a legal framework through student and labor activities and electoral participation. Clearly the Soviet Union appeared to be in no position to underwrite any signifigant armed struggle in Latin America. [Ref. 10:pp. 53-65] Regardless of the ideological inconsistencies in the two doctrines, and the offhanded manner with which Fidel had secured power over the pro-Soviet Popular Socialist Party, Cuba and the Soviet Union were united in their common desire to counter U.S. influence in the region. As early as July 1959, Ramiro Valdès Menéndez (then head of the rebel army's intelligence, and now Minister of the Interior) had met with the Soviet

Ambassador and KGB officials in Mexico [Ref. 11:p. 162]. This was three months prior to the alleged bombing of Havana by a Cuban Air Force defector, supposedly at the behest of the United States, that served to give Fidel a "legitimate" reason to turn to Moscow for help [Ref. 6:pp. 73-74].

By the fall of 1960, the U.S. State Department claimed that the Soviet bloc had sent Cuba in excess of 28,000 tons of arms for use in exporting its revolution [Ref. 12:p. 21]. The first Cuban efforts along these lines appear to have been directed against Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, in 1959. By early 1962, Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt had publically accused both the Soviets and Cubans of supporting Venezuelan insurgents. Subsequent investigation of the charges by the Organization of American States (OAS) produced sufficient evidence of Cuban subversion to warrant the imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, and to the break of formal relations between it and all Latin American countries save Mexico. [Ref. 10:pp. 38-39]

In the meantime, the outcome of the 1962 missile crisis had effectively guaranteed that, for the time being, the U.S. would not intervene militarily against the Castro regime [Ref. 6:pp. 125-26]. At the same time, Krushchev's retreat made Fidel doubtful of Soviet commitment to the island. In an attempt to gain a constituency among the Third World, and thereby remove itself from the focus of

superpower confrontation, Cuba found itself criticizing the concept of peaceful coexistence as negating the interests of small states at the expense of superpower accord.

[Ref. 13:p. 170]

Caught between Soviet reluctance to involve itself further in the region, and the condemnation of the OAS, the *fidelistas* sought ideological support from Peking for their revolutionary activities abroad. Prior to Castro's victory, the Chinese had advocated violence only against the most repressive regimes, and unarmed, broad, united-front action elsewhere. During Che Guevara's visit to Peking in 1960, the Chinese had agreed that the Cuban model was appropriate for other liberation struggles in Latin America, and later condemned Soviet revisionism over the missile crisis. The rapprochement was short-lived, however. Cuba could only go so far in siding with Peking during the growing Sino-Soviet rift, and did not invite the Chinese nor any Latin American Maoists to the November 1964 Conference of Latin American Communist Parties. Fidel went even further and openly attacked the Chinese at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, after which the Chinese advocated their own revolutionary experience as the correct model for further struggle in the Third World. [Ref. 10:pp. 18-19]

While affirming Moscow's authority over the Latin American Communists, the 1964 Conference did make some concessions to the Castroites. Cuba's role as the

revolutionary vanguard was stressed, and it was agreed to actively support rebel groups in Venezuela, Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti. Elsewhere, broad united fronts and legal tactics were urged. [Ref. 10:pp. 196-97] Unfortunately for Fidel, the U.S. invasion of Santo Domingo in April 1965 caused the Soviets to reiterate their preference for "peaceful transition" [Ref. 14:p. 46]. This was coupled with a poor showing of active Castroite groups abroad. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the National Liberation Front (FALN) in Venezuela, as well as the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala, were plagued by infighting among Maoist and pro-Soviet elements. In addition, the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Columbia, the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in Nicaragua, and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Peru had all suffered terrible losses, and were in a state of retreat or dormancy. [Ref. 14: pp. 103, 112, 121-23, 129]

Determined not to lose Cuba's status as international *foco*, Fidel used the 1966 Tricontinental Conference of Third World Liberation Forces in Havana to chastise Soviet and traditional Communist Parties for their reluctance to support revolutionary struggles. Fidel reiterated Che Guevara's stated desire to create "two, three, many Vietnams" in Latin America [Ref. 14:pp. 46-47]. He also made some notable contacts at the conference, including

Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, the Venezuelan terrorist better known as "Carlos the Jackal," who received guerrilla training in Cuba immediately afterwards, and the Italian millionaire terrorist, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli [Ref. 11:pp. 2-3].

Fidel formalized the split with pro-Soviet factions the following year at the meeting of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity in Havana, accusing the Soviet bloc of "aiding the oligarchs" of Latin America by pursuing normal relations [Ref. 10:p. 45]. In January 1967, the Cuban government published Régis Debray's ¿Revolución en la Revolución?, advocating the applicability of the Cuban model of guerrilla warfare, and crediting its success with the avoidance of "imported plans" and restrictive ties to existing parties [Ref. 10:pp. 30-32].

Rhetoric was accompanied by action. Cuba made clear its support for the guerrillas in Venezuela in May 1967 by openly sending them arms and men. When confronted by the Venezuelan government, the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) responded:

We are accused of helping the revolutionary movement and it is true, we are helping and will help, whenever we are asked to do so, all the revolutionary movements that fight imperialism anywhere in the world. [Ref. 15]

The leadership of the Colombian ELN and the Peruvian MIR also made statements supporting a Castroist line independent from a Marxist-Leninist influence [Ref. 10:pp. 120-22].

None of this, however, could mitigate the crushing defeat of

Che Guevara's Bolivian *foco* in October 1967, in part due to the failure to reach an accomodation with Mario Monje's pro-Soviet Communist Party of Bolivia [Ref. 16:p. 98].

Guevara's death could not have come at a worse time. The Soviets had already reacted to Fidel's rebelliousness by cutting back the supply of oil and arms to Cuba [Ref. 14: p. 47]. At home Fidel was criticized by a "microfaction" of pro-Soviet elements in the PCC. He responded by convicting their leader, Anibal Escalante, and 34 others of subversion in January 1968. Two months later, however, Fidel had to admit that the microfaction had been right. A rising domestic sentiment against an adventurist foreign policy in the face of economic problems forced him to reevaluate his position, and set the stage for a rapprochement with Moscow. [Ref. 6:pp. 139-41]

Noting the failure of rural guerrilla warfare as a catalyst for widespread revolution in Latin America, and unable to break out of his isolation from the OAS, Castro was more than willing to shelve his foreign policy at Moscow's behest. Several other accommodations had to be made. On August 23, 1968, Fidel endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Granma Weekly Review's coverage of the Soviet Union became more positive, and a Cuban-Soviet Friendship Society was established. In June 1969, Cuba sent a delegation to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, and though it

did not sign the ensuing declaration, its presence was a clear indication of anti-Peking solidarity. On April 22, 1970, in a speech honoring Lenin's birthday, Fidel gave the Soviet's full credit for the survival of the revolution, and attacked Moscow's critics in the radical left.

[Ref. 6:pp. 213-14]

The Soviet response was generous. Trade protocols were signed in 1969 and 1970, with the Soviets granting long-term credits to cover the mounting Cuban trade deficit [Ref. 6: pp. 213-14]. The flow of military assistance was renewed. On January 1, 1969, the reequipping of the Cuban Armed Forces was announced in Krasnaya Zvezda, and in July a Soviet naval squadron made the first of many Cuban port visits [Ref. 14:p. 53]. Raúl Castro visited Moscow in the Spring of 1970, and generated an agreement to provide Cuba improved SA-2 air defense missiles and 25 MiG-21 fighters [Ref. 17].

As far as the other Latin America powers were concerned, Cuba's new found docility opened the door to improved relations. By advocating nonviolent paths to socialism, Fidel mollified traditional leftist parties, and secured diplomatic ties with Salvador Allende's Popular Unity Government in Chile. He was also able to establish relations with the nationalist regime in Peru in 1972, despite their anti-Communist stance. [Ref. 6:p. 142] The Peronist government in Argentina and several

English-speaking islands in the Caribbean with populist governments also broke the OAS sanctions and re-established relations soon after [Ref. 13:p. 171].

The Latin American radical left, however, was not so pleased with the new Cuban policy. In 1969, Cuba terminated its regular radio broadcasts to revolutionaries in Venezuela and Chile. Douglas Bravo, leader of the Castroite FALN in Venezuela, accused Fidel of selling out to the Soviets, and was joined in his criticism by other guerrilla leaders. Fidel responded in a speech quoted in Granma on May 3, 1970:

Cuba has not refused nor will she ever refuse support to the revolutionary movement. But this is not to be confused with support for just any faker [or for] destroyers of revolutions, men who had the opportunity to wage a revolutionary war, [but] instead sabotaged and destroyed it . . . .

That kind of pseudorevolutionary cannot count on any help from Cuba, of course. Ah! But revolutionaries like Che, revolutionaries like Che who are ready to fight and die, this kind of revolutionary can always count on receiving aid from Cuba. [Ref. 10:p. 37]

Thus Fidel could rationalize nonsupport to "pseudorevolutionaries." At the same time he appeared quite willing to provide support in low-risk/low-cost situations. For example, in October 1970, Sandinist guerrillas hijacked a Costa Rican airliner to Cuba. Four U.S. citizens were held hostage pending the release of FSLN leader Carlos Fonseca Amador and three associates imprisoned in Costa Rica. The freed Fonseca went on to Cuba, where he remained for several years. [Ref. 10:p. 129]



The failure of the 10 million ton sugar harvest in 1970 underscored Cuba's growing dependence on Moscow and spread the process of Sovietization to economic and internal affairs. Fidel's personal credibility as a leader was weakened, and the Soviet's sought to constrain his authority. Some of Castro's personal entourage was replaced with more qualified personnel. This involved a concurrent loss of authority on economic issues. In December 1970, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a long time Soviet supporter, was named chairman of the joint Inter-governmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and in 1972 he became Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Economic and Political Affairs in the newly established Executive Committee to the Council of Ministers. A Socialist constitution modeled after the 1936 Soviet constitution was drafted, giving highest authority to the PCC. In spite of these actions, Fidel lost little real power or prestige. He was designated both "head of state" and "head of government," as well as given power to take command of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. [Ref. 18:p. 14] Bringing into the ruling circle trusted lieutenants like Rodriguez, Osvald Dorticos as President, and his brother Raúl as Minister of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) helped Fidel to retain the allegiance of the Cubans most trusted by Moscow, had a positive effect on domestic decisionmaking processes [Ref. 18:p. v].

The Soviets also exacted other concessions from the Cubans at this time. In November 1971, Fidel signed a joint communiqué with Premier Alexei Kosygin endorsing Soviet foreign policy, as well as accepting full blame for the previous rift. The USSR was officially recognized in Granma as the leading Socialist State. In the spring of 1972, Fidel made a 66-day visit to North Africa and the Warsaw Pact nations, timing his visit at each to reflect the host's subservience to Moscow. In September 1973, Fidel found himself defending the USSR by attacking the theory of "two imperialisms" at the 4th Conference of the Heads of State of Nonaligned Countries in Algiers, amidst heavy criticism by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhafi of Libya. [Ref. 14:pp. 51-52]

Strategic accommodations were also made. The second Soviet naval deployment to Cuba in May of 1970 included a visit of three submarines, including an ECHO II SSGN, to Cienfuegos, on the southern coast. The arrival of a submarine tender and two repair barges in August, and the subsequent start-up of shore construction, gave all indications that the Soviets intended to develop a permanent base. Protests from Washington forced the ships to leave after only a few days, but a Soviet tug remained in the area and submarine visits continued, including visits by GOLF SSB's. These visits may have been a part of the Soviet bargaining strategy for the SALT I negotiations, and as such

yet another case of Cuba becoming the focus of superpower confrontation. [Ref. 19]

The Cuban intelligence service was also brought under strict Soviet control. The General Directorate for Intelligence (DGI) had been cooperative with the KGB since the aforementioned visit by Valdez to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in 1959. In 1968, the DGI unilaterally gave intelligence collected against the U.S. to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and other bloc members. In 1970, KGB Colonel Viktor Simonev took over the reins as the DGI's director, personally approving all operational plans and budgets prior to final approval from Moscow. Immediately afterwards, the DGI received substantial increases in their resources, purchased new equipment, and recruited 100 new agents in two weeks. [Ref. 11:p. 24] The DGI acts exclusively against the United States, and as such has essentially unlimited resources. The former Cuban director, Manuel Piñeiro Losada, was named head of the Americas Department, which operates against Latin American countries on a more restricted budget. [Ref. 11:p. 9]

Cuban-Soviet policy on Latin America remained parallel throughout the remainder of the 1970's, with both seeking to expand influence through normal diplomatic and economic relations. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had established diplomatic ties with 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Major economic missions were

founded in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Panama. Soviet bloc industrial equipment and credits were exchanged mostly for foodstuffs and raw materials. [Ref. 14: pp. 18-19] In 1972, 60% of Cuban trade was with the Soviets, and their trade deficit was probably up to \$3 billion, with a total debt of \$4 billion [Ref. 20]. In July 1972, Rodriguez, while in Moscow, announced Cuba's full membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and by 1974, a 5-Year-Plan paralleling the Soviet planning cycle for 1976-80 was also unveiled [Ref. 18: p. 15].

The fall of the Allende government in Chile was a setback for the new policy of moderation. The Soviets blamed the Castroite MIR and ultra-leftists for weakening socialist unity, as well as links between the military and the United States. To prevent a similar coup in Peru, the Soviets increased military aid to Lima to wean the junta from the Pentagon's influence. This failed to prevent the 1975 takeover by the pro-U.S. Bermudez regime, as well as right-wing coups in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina, causing some in Moscow to doubt the validity of "peaceful transition" in Latin America. In the final analysis, however, Soviet strategy remained essentially unchanged, though the focus of economic and military support shifted to Argentina and the Southern cone. [Ref. 14:pp. 28-29]

Likewise, in Havana, Fidel did not regard the reactionary counteroffensive as a permanent condition. In an interview with a Mexican newsman on January 10, 1975, Castro said:

. . . I do not believe that the possibility of such radical changes as those which took place in Cuba is within sight at this moment. Even though all objective conditions for radical changes in Latin America do exist, it is undeniable that the subjective conditions are not yet present, but we salute the process of change.  
[Ref. 18:pp. 36-38]

Some of these changes included the emergence of Venezuelan petro-wealth, Panama's efforts to recover the canal, and more pertinently, the lifting of OAS sanctions against Cuba at the San Jose Conference in August 1975.

Detente between the superpowers in the mid-1970's provided Cuba the unusual opportunity to appeal for support from liberal elements in the United States. Such a rapprochement could have given Fidel the opportunity to import Western technology necessary to ensure economic growth, and to reduce his dependence on the Soviets. Fidel was able to soften his anti-U.S. rhetoric, and allowed visits to Cuba by such personages as Pat Holt (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), Senators Jacob Javits, Claiborne Pell, and George McGovern, as well as a number of academicians. [Ref. 18:p. 22] In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger invited Havana to engage in secret negotiations to resolve U.S.-Cuban relations. Two Cuban

envoys spent almost a year in Washington and New York towards this end, but the talks were terminated with the Cuban refusal to withdraw combat troops from Angola.

[Ref. 21: pp. 198-99]

Detente also served as a further guarantee to Castro that the U.S. would not invade Cuba nor contest an active foreign policy. As the focus of world confrontation shifted from East-West to North-South, Castro was able to pursue his role as a spokesperson for the Third World, rather than be perceived as a Soviet puppet. On the other hand, detente cast further doubt as to the reliability of continued Soviet support in case of a regional conflict. Hence Fidel continued to build up his military forces, and still proclaimed imperialism to be the enemy of the revolution. [Ref. 18:pp. 53-56] At the First Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1975, senior military officers from the chiefs of staff were appointed to membership and alternate posts in the Party Central Committee -- further evidence of an emerging militancy in the Cuban power structure [Ref. 18:pp. iii-iv].

All in all, in 1975 the Cubans appeared to be much more concerned with the impact of the continued international economic crisis on the Third World, than with any possible long-term effects of superpower detente [Ref. 18: pp. 53-56]. Cuba's Latin American strategy in the 1970's

became more moderate so as to unite the countries in a broad front to obtain maximum leverage against both superpowers in the framework of detente. The implication was that a united path of nonviolent confrontation would receive the most favorable attention in Washington, and give them the best chance to survive economically without Moscow. Therefore, they were forced to abandon their earlier demands that proper revolutions follow the Cuban model.

[Ref. 18:pp. 66-71]

If Fidel's aspirations in his own hemisphere seemed subdued during the 1970's, one only has to look to Africa to see that his goal of becoming a spiritual leader of Third World revolution was still being sought. In May 1977 he said:

Africa is the weakest link of imperialism today . . . . Imperialist domination is not as strong there as in Latin America. Therefore the possibility for fundamental changes on the African continent is real.  
[Ref. 22]

Since the early part of the decade he had been sending technical and military advisers, medical support, and a limited amount of arms to revolutionary missions in Guinea-Conakry, Congo (Brazzaville), Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, and Tanzania [Ref. 23: p. 43]. In addition, Cuba sent military advisers to help train both the South Yemeni army and the Dhofari guerrillas in Oman. Israeli intelligence claims that 4,000 Cubans were stationed in Syria during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, though their exact

role during the conflict is still under debate. This was not the first time Cuba had committed regular troops to an internationalist mission. In 1963, they had sent 400 troops to aid Algeria in their conflict with Morocco. With this in mind it is apparent that the subsequent Cuban involvement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was a continuation of their own foreign policy, albeit on a much larger scale.

[Ref. 21:pp. 202-204]

Angola had long been an arena of ideological confrontation between Washington, Moscow, and Peking, yet superpower support to their respective champions in the conflict had been meager and inconsistent. Cuba, on the other hand, had been active supporters of the MPLA since the early 1960's, training guerrillas from bases in Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia. After the 1974 coup in Portugal and the decision to divest its colonies, Angola again became the focus of superpower interest, with each of the three hoping to block the others' influence in the region. Conflict between the MPLA (backed by Moscow and Havana), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (both ultimately backed by Washington and Peking) escalated with the influx of arms into Angola. [Ref. 21:pp. 209-181]

Cuba's initial commitment in the spring of 1975 was 230 advisers sent to operate four camps to train the MPLA on use



of Soviet weaponry. With the onset of South African assistance to the opposition, the MPLA asked Moscow for more arms as well as advisers. When the Soviets refused to commit manpower, the MPLA turned to Cuba for help. Havana responded in September, and increased the number of Cuban advisers to 1500. At the time of the invasion by South Africa in late October, Cuba had begun to send regular troops by air and sealift, reaching a maximum influx of 1,000 per week by January 1976. By March, the South African assault was repelled and victory for the MPLA was secured.

[Ref. 21:pp. 209-18]

In April 1976, Fidel made the claim that the Cuban commitment in Angola was made independently of Moscow. This claim is supported by the following facts:

1. Cuba had a long, consistent relationship with the MPLA.
2. At the time of the Portuguese coup, a rival faction of the MPLA, led by Daniel Chipenda, was supported by Moscow, while Havana continued to back the original leader, Agostinho Neto.
3. Moscow would not commit advisers, who would be expected to supervise the Cuban advisers.
4. Fidel committed 500 members of his personal guard, the Prime Minister's Reserve Troops.
5. During the most intense fighting in November 1975, Cuba was forced to use its own air and sealift assets. The Soviets had never provided such equipment in 15 years of arming the Cubans.
6. Even after the Soviets committed themselves to the conflict, and supplied airlift and arms to the Cubans, their joint operations did not appear to be centrally coordinated. [Ref. 21:pp. 219-21]

7. At that time, the region was far outside the normal Soviet sphere of influence [Ref. 24:p. 93], whereas Cuba had a strong African racial heritage relating them to African liberation movements.
8. Because of the MPLA's internal weaknesses, Moscow appeared to support a political solution, perhaps in the form of a coalition government, at least until the fall of 1975 [Ref. 24:pp. 98-102].
9. Moscow was unwilling to risk a Chinese-American alliance in regard to Angola that could set a dangerous precedent in the Third World [Ref. 24:p. 103].

Nonetheless, Moscow was obviously quite pleased with the outcome in Angola and rewarded Cuba handsomely. Fidel was honored at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1976 [Ref. 25:p. 154], and Cuban military equipment used in the conflict was upgraded within the next two years. T-34 tanks from the Korean era were replaced by T-62 tanks and ZSU 23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns [Ref. 25:p. 159]. The Soviets also supplied 15 to 18 MiG-23F fighters the following year, even at the risk of jeopardizing the SALT II negotiations [Ref. 21:pp. 222-23].

The Angolan venture was a great personal victory for Fidel at home and elsewhere, though he delayed telling his own people about the involvement of Cuban troops until he was sure of the MPLA victory. The Nonaligned Movement praised the Cuban intervention at its 1976 Conference in Sri Lanka, and invited Fidel to host the next summit. [Ref. 21: pp. 222-23] Most black African nations were amazed to see tiny Cuba take on white supremacist South Africa, and even the Latin American States, while reminded of the Castroism of

the 1960's, were not dissuaded from the process of normalization of relations with Havana. Of future benefit may be Angola's oil producing capacity, should the flow of oil from Moscow ever be cut off. [Ref. 23:p. 33]

Cuban autonomy from Moscow was much less evident in the intervention in Ethiopia between 1977 and 1979. Cuba had long been a supporter of the Socialist regime in Somalia, and Moscow's decision to shift bloc support to the new Marxist Dergue in Addis Ababa placed Havana in a position of straddling the fence in the age-old conflict over the Ogaden. In an attempt to preserve Socialist solidarity, as well as to maintain his own position as champion of the Third World, Castro presided over negotiations between Mengistu Haile-Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia in March 1977, to no avail. In November, Somalia severed diplomatic relations with the Socialist bloc. [Ref. 23: pp. 36-38]

The subsequent employment of Cuban troops in the ensuing war over the Ogaden was both a monument to Fidel's failure to negotiate an ideological solution, and clear evidence that Havana could not prevent being drawn into a role as Soviet proxy. Coordination of the initial influx of troops was coordinated by Raúl Castro in Addis Ababa and in Moscow. 17,000 Cuban regulars were landed in Soviet troop transports, with the Soviets committing 1,000 of their own advisers to the campaign. Standard Soviet assault tactics

were employed, and the Cubans were always under the direct control of four Soviet general officers. [Ref. 23:p. 39, Ref. 26:p. 144]

This obviously was not without its costs. Cuba found it difficult, if not impossible, to keep from being drawn into the internal struggle between the Dergue and the Moslem Eritreans seeking to secede from Ethiopia. A quick victory for the Dergue would definitely have been to Moscow's advantage by reducing the military and economic aid necessary for a sustained struggle, and by securing ports on the Red Sea. Even so Cuba pointedly avoided any overt signs of commitment, but even unconfirmed allegations of direct Cuban involvement evoked criticism by Algeria, Yugoslavia, Portugal, and even Angola. The issue divided the African States as to the legitimacy of the Cuban presence and threatened to jeopardize Cuba's membership in the Nonaligned Movement. Only through the mediation of Yugoslavia, host of the 1978 Conference, was Havana's position as chair of the 1979 Conference salvaged. [Ref. 21:pp. 231-35]

The Havana summit provided Fidel a chance to legitimize his Soviet ties by pursuing the thesis of a "natural alliance" between the Third World and the Socialist bloc. The failure to persuade the movement of this notion was a personal setback, and his heavy handed tactics during the discussions regarding the Cambodian issue caused some members to question his objectivity as chairman. Even

though the final declaration was somewhat more anti-Western than previous conference outcomes, Fidel was unable to maximize his power within the movement.

[Ref. 13:pp. 173-75]

Cuba's inability to justify its Ethiopian involvement and its ties to Moscow was exacerbated by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Cuba waited a full year to endorse the invasion, it nonetheless bore the brunt of the criticism from the nonaligned nations. The immediate result was its defeat in the 1979 United Nations Security Council Election. [Ref. 13:pp. 176-77]

The events of the late 1970's clearly pointed out the difficulties of maintaining advocacy positions in both the Third World and the Socialist camp. It appears that further Cuban involvement in Africa will be perceived by most nations as being under direct Soviet control. In 1983 there were still 35,000 Cubans fighting in Angola and Ethiopia, leading some to argue that Africa has become Cuba's "Vietnam." With this in mind, it makes sense that Cuba would avoid further African involvement and reassess prospects for improving its international position by operating closer to home -- specifically in the Caribbean Basin and its littoral states. [Ref. 21:pp. 236-37]

### III. THE CUBAN OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: 1978-1983

In June 1975, Fidel hosted a conference in Havana for 24 Communist Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean. All of the invited parties were advocates of Soviet ideology; Maoists, Trotskyites, and radical Castroites were conspicuously absent. The ensuing Declaration of Havana generally advocated the standard Soviet strategy regarding Latin America -- that of united anti-imperialist action with other progressive leftist and bourgeois groups. The conference and the declaration seemed to reflect Fidel's full acceptance of this strategy. [Ref. 10:pp. 217-19]

Nevertheless, the Declaration conceded that it was the "right and duty of all revolutionary forces to answer counterrevolutionary violence with revolutionary violence" [Ref. 27:p. 361]. This was sufficient justification for Fidel to continue low level support to Castroite movements throughout the region. By 1978, the "human rights" policies of the Carter administration, the U.S. pathological avoidance of anything resembling another Vietnam, and increasing Latin American anti-imperialism presented Fidel with an opportunity to renew a regional offensive in earnest. In this case, it appears the Soviets were more than willing to let Cuba lead the way, so long as Fidel's adventurism did not result in any Soviet diplomatic

setbacks. Indeed, they were more than willing to partake of the fruits of Cuba's labor.

#### A. NICARAGUA

The Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua was targeted for Cuban-sponsored insurrection as early as 1959 [Ref. 10:p. 40].

A small Castroite guerrilla group adopted the name, *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN), in 1962. Until the mid-1970's, the group probably had less than 100 active guerrillas, recruited primarily from radical members of the *Partido Socialista Nicaragüense*. [Ref. 10:p. 128]

At the height of *fidelismo* in 1967, the FSLN leader, Carlos Amador Fonseca, openly declared war on the Nicaraguan government, led by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Even after Castro's rapprochement with Moscow and subsequent criticism by many Latin American leftists, the Sandinistas retained the fundamentals of Castroist ideology in their 1969 Program, saying that the FSLN:

. . . grew out of the Nicaraguan people's need for a vanguard organization, which through a direct struggle with its enemies, is capable of seizing political power and establishing a social system that will wipe out the exploitation and misery our country has suffered throughout its existence.

The FSLN is a political-military organization whose objective is the seizure of political power through the destruction of the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the dictatorship and the establishment of a Revolutionary Government based on a worker-peasant alliance and the support of all the anti-imperialist forces of the country. [Ref. 28, emphasis in original]

Amador was arrested in Costa Rica in August 1969. In October 1970, he was released along with three other guerrillas in exchange for four U.S. citizens held hostage after the hijacking of a Costa Rican airliner to Cuba. He spent the next several years in Cuba, during which time the FSLN engaged in only limited activities. In December 1974, the FSLN began a program of urban terror by raiding a Christmas party in Managua, killing several people, and kidnapping a dozen well-known *Somozistas*. After the negotiated release of several guerrillas, all were given safe conduct to Cuba. [Ref. 10:pp. 128-30]

The devastating earthquake in 1972, and the subsequent influx of foreign aid, brought the class struggle in Nicaragua to a head. Mismanagement and misappropriation of relief moneys drastically undercut popular support for the government. Somoza's reaction to the 1974 Christmas incident had been to declare martial law in an attempt to isolate and destroy the FSLN. Although he almost succeeded, the repressive tactics further served to radicalize the populus. [Ref. 29] The 1978 murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of La Prensa and leader of the moderate Democratic Liberation Union, effectively removed any chance for a negotiated solution between Somoza and the Sandinistas [Ref. 30:p. 153].

In July 1978, the FSLN took advantage of the ensuing popular unrest joining with the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie in



the *Frente Amplio de Oposición* (FAO), a broad front which enjoyed the support of the Carter administration. At the same time the Sandinistas continued to wage urban guerrilla warfare from support bases in *focos* in the northern mountains. On August 22, a guerrilla group led by Edén Pastora took over the National Palace, taking 500 hostages and ransoming them for \$5 million and the release of 83 Sandinista prisoners, including Tomás Borge. As the FAO program of strikes and demonstrations continued to fail to unseat Somoza, the radical tactics of the FSLN gained widespread support. Eventually the Sandinistas led the breakup of the FAO in protest over direct U.S. involvement in negotiations. The National Patriotic Front (FPN), under Sandinista control, was organized along a broad front that decried the actions of both the imperialists and the bourgeoisie. [Ref. 30:p. 154-58]

The Cubans had been instrumental in helping the Sandinistas overcome their own internal factionalism in order to pull together the other anti-Somoza groups. Armando Ulises Estrada, of the Americas Department, had engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Havana and the guerrillas since 1977. He also constructed a supply network, funneling arms from Cuba through Panama and Costa Rica. By late 1978, Cuban advisers were stationed in the mountains of Costa Rica to train and equip the FSLN. In 1979, Fidel drew together an "internationalist brigade"

composed of other Latin American extremists to assist the FSLN. When factionalism again threatened to disrupt operations, he met personally with the leaders to negotiate a solution. Cuban military advisers from the Department of Special Operations fought alongside the FSLN in the final offensive, maintaining direct communications with Havana. Several were wounded and returned to Cuba via Panama.

[Ref. 31]

After the military victory was secured, Julian Lopez Diaz, the Cuban chief of the America's Department secret operation center in San Jose, Costa Rica, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua. His assistant, Andres Barahona, was redocumented as a Nicaraguan and made de facto head of the new intelligence service, the Sandinista General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). The organization was quickly patterned along classic KGB/DGI lines.

[Ref. 32:p. 50]

The method of operations from secure *focos* in the countryside, the relatively small size of the vanguard (the Sandinistas numbered no more than 500 at the time of Somoza's downfall), and the anti-US character of the FSLN confirm their Castroite origins [Ref. 30:p. 163]. Other similarities between the Nicaraguan and the Cuban revolutions include the fact that both struggles employed broad fronts united against personal figures (Somoza and Batista), and the relative youth of the radical leadership.

In both cases, Moscow remained a cautious observer until victory was secured. On the other hand, the Sandinistas were able to ally with the Church and private sectors of the economy, and had supportive arrangements with not only Cuba, but also Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), and the Socialist International. Fidel enjoyed none of this support in 1959, and his struggle was against a regime backed by a then regionally dominant United States. [Ref. 33:pp. 6-8]

Despite the differences, the Sandinistas moved to consolidate power much as Fidel had done in Cuba. The FSLN retained absolute control of the coercive powers of the military and security forces. Sandinista Defense Committees were formed to mobilize the population for security tasks. Banks, financial, and foreign trade institutions were nationalized, and some private holdings were confiscated. Public education was restructured with a high ideological content, and the media came under state control. On the other hand, the Sandinistas retained a pluralistic economy, probably on the advice of Fidel, who warned them not to radicalize the revolution too swiftly, lest reactionary forces move to weaken the FSLN power base. [Ref. 33:pp. 2-3]

Cuba's tutelage of the FSLN also gave the Sandinistas an advantage the *fidelistas* never had -- that of a

revolutionary ally with the same language, culture, and heritage, as well as a direct bridge to Soviet support [Ref. 33:p. 9]. The Sandinistas gave Cuba something as well; an opportunity to renew the Latin American offensive by providing evidence of the success of a Castroite revolution. Fidel moved rapidly to take his position as champion of the Sandinista cause. In July 1979, he challenged the United States and the rest of the world to join in with an international campaign to support the new government. By extolling moderation on the Sandinista's part during their first few years in power, he helped them to avoid military and economic sanctions, and thus to secure their revolution. [Ref. 21:pp. 261-63]

At the same time, Fidel commenced an influx of Cuban technical assistance and Socialist bloc arms into Nicaragua. By 1981, the FSLN had received \$28 million worth of arms and approximately 5,000 Cuban advisers, teachers, and medical personnel throughout the country. About 1,500 of them were engaged in the training of the Sandinista Army and security forces in such areas as combat training, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities, security for the FSLN leadership, and organization of the police force. Although the Sandinistas would occasionally announce the return to Cuba of large numbers of teachers, this was usually done to provide them vacation time at home. Of course, little

fanfare was provided upon their return to Nicaragua. [Ref. 31]

Cuba almost immediately utilized its foothold in Nicaragua to step up its activities in El Salvador and Guatemala. Diaz and other America Department officials met frequently in Managua with guerrilla leaders to provide them guidance, and the city effectively became a safehouse for extremist groups. Some of the guerrillas were sent to military training camps in the Middle East, as a result of a joint effort by Cuba, the FSLN, and the PLO. Between October 1980 and February 1981, Cuba directed a massive flow of arms through Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, in an attempt to launch a major rebel offensive in El Salvador. Many of the same logistics mechanisms and tactics established in the Sandinista struggle were utilized. [Ref. 31] This included supplying the guerrillas with U.S. M-16's captured in Vietnam, German G-3's, and Israeli UZI's, rather than with Soviet weapons, so not to jeopardize international sympathy [Ref. 32:p. 48].

The failure of the El Salvador offensive and the suspension of U.S. aid to Nicaragua in January 1981 slowed the flow of arms to the guerrillas, but did not dissuade the Cubans and the Soviets from arming the Sandinistas. In February 1981, the Sandinista's began to build a militia of 200,000, ostensibly to defend the revolution from reactionary elements. [Ref. 34:p. 21] Soviet support

towards this aim became more overt. By February 1982, the Soviet and Socialist bloc states began shipping directly to Nicaragua, and Soviet hardware such as T-54/55 tanks and MI-8 helicopters began showing up in the Sandinista Army's inventory. [Ref. 32:p. 52]

The State Department estimated that by 1983, the Soviet bloc had negotiated for more than \$200 million worth of arms and military assistance to Nicaragua. Cuban military advisers in-country numbered about 2,000, with 200 more from the USSR, other Soviet bloc nations, Libya, and the PLO. At the same time, Soviet military aid to Cuba, in 1982 alone, was \$250 million, with the Cubans receiving 68.3 thousand metric tons of seaborne military deliveries -- the largest amount since the 1962 missile crisis. This appears to have been a convincing demonstration of Soviet support for Fidel's policies. [Ref. 34:p. 9; Ref. 35:p. 14]

Emboldened by this show of solidarity, the involvement of Cuban regulars in the fighting in Nicaragua increased. In February 1983, Miskito Indians reported that they had shot down two helicopters piloted by Cubans, and reported that three Cuban infantry battalions, along with some Grenadians, were operating in the gold-mining region of Bonanza. Another 600 Cubans were reportedly stationed to defend Puerto Cabezas on the Caribbean coast. In May 1983, the Cuban Vice Minister of Defense, General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a brilliant tactician with extensive experience in

Africa, made a secret fact-finding mission to Nicaragua. Defense Department officials believed it may have signalled even more Cuban troop involvement in the future.

[Ref. 32:pp. 53-54]

At the same time, in the face of criticism of the Sandinistas by the Reagan administration, the Cubans hesitated to commit themselves whole-heartedly to a military solution to the struggle. Instead of a direct response to Reagan's characterization of the *contras* as "freedom fighters," Cuban Ambassador Raul Roa declared Cuban interest in the Contadora process in a speech to the United Nations on 17 May, 1983 [Ref. 36]. In July 1983, on the 30th anniversary of the Cuban revolutionary movement, Fidel offered to withdraw his advisers and halt military aid to Nicaragua if all other countries would agree to do the same throughout Central America. He insisted, however, that there were only 200 Cuban advisers there. [Ref. 37] The fall of the Bishop regime in Grenada in October 1983 caused both the Cubans and the Soviets to proceed even more cautiously. Immediately after the U.S. intervention, the Sandinistas claimed that Cuba had pledged to defend Nicaragua against invasion. The Cubans did not vouch for any such commitment. [Ref. 38] Nor did Havana or Moscow offer much more than sympathy and moral support in their statements concerning the U.S. mining of Nicaragua's ports [Ref. 39].

Nevertheless, Cuban and Soviet support have made Nicaragua into a garrison state, with resources that can be readily used for aggression against its neighbors given a more favorable correlation of forces. These include:

- About 150 T54/T55 tanks and PT amphibious tanks.
- 220 other armed vehicles, including armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles.
- Approximately 200 antiaircraft guns and 300 missile launchers, and more than 700 SAM-7 missiles.
- 100 antitank guns.
- Approximately 24 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.
- More than 50 Soviet 152mm and 122mm howitzers, with ranges in excess of 17 kilometers.
- Over 50 aircraft, including approximately five Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters.

The Sandinista Armed Forces currently numbers 62,000 on active duty and another 57,000 on reserve. Substantial increases to this number appear unlikely in the near term due to popular resistance to the draft. Forty percent of males over 18 years of age are already in uniform. [Ref. 40]

The military airport under construction in Punta Huate confirms the open declarations of the Sandinistas' desire to acquire combat aircraft. Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics have received MiG training in Eastern Europe, and are currently flying in Cuba. The 10,000-foot runway would also be able to accommodate Soviet TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft. [Ref. 34:pp. 27-28] The strong rhetoric of the Reagan administration during the "cratology incident" in the



fall of 1984 may delay further acquisition of MiG's or the stationing of Soviet aircraft in Nicaragua until more favorable conditions prevail. In January of 1984, Fidel described his relationship with Nicaragua by saying:

We give them moral support, and we have never denied that we don't have military advisers in Nicaragua. I don't want to help the aggressive plans of the U.S. administration by mentioning figures. For the same reason, I will not discuss arms supplies to Nicaragua. Nicaragua is an independent country. It has a right to request arms and any independent country has a right to supply them . . . . We cannot unilaterally withdraw our advisers from Nicaragua. That decision is Nicaragua's. The Nicaraguans have said they are ready to freeze the purchase of all arms, they are ready to withdraw all advisers if the United States withdraws its advisers from Central America and if all weapons supply to Central America stops. [Ref. 41]

These provisions, either through the Contadora process or other multilateral negotiations, leaves Cuba with everything to gain and little to lose. A cessation of all arms shipments to Central America would still leave Nicaragua with a military force vastly superior to its neighbors. The presence of Cuban advisers would be difficult to detect, due to the obvious shared racial composition and language, and the device of redocumenting Cubans as Nicaraguans.

Most importantly, Castro is apparently unwilling to go to the wall with the United States over the Nicaraguan question. Although there would undoubtedly be Cuban losses should the U.S. invade Nicaragua, he would not want the fighting to spread to Cuba. By endorsing the Contadora

process, he is signalling to us that Nicaragua is indeed a negotiable item, and that his first priority, as always, is the security of his own state. Regionally, his endorsement is necessary for him to avoid criticism by or isolation from the other Latin American States.

Fidel is also concerned by what he sees to be a lack of Soviet resolve in confronting the Reagan administration over the issue. Sources in Moscow reported that he was "profoundly annoyed" when a Soviet naval flotilla turned back from Nicaragua in March 1984 after a Soviet tanker was incapacitated by a mine in Puerto Sandino harbor. Supposedly this displeasure was the motivation in Fidel's absence from the Chernenko funeral. [Ref. 42] He may also be distressed to see Managua become more dependent on Soviet aid, and less committed to the ideal of a Latin America made up of independent Socialist states. As the only head of state to attend Daniel Ortega Saavedra's inauguration [Ref. 43], Fidel has displayed his solidarity with the Sandinistas, but he is left in the awkward position of seeing yet another Latin American revolution become Sovietized, at least in part due to his own inability to control regional events.

#### B. EL SALVADOR

The guerrilla groups in El Salvador have their roots firmly planted in Castroist and Maoist ideology. In 1966,

the prominent Salvadoran leftist, Roque Dalton Garcia, stated in World Marxist Review that conditions in Latin America were unlike those in Europe, where the bourgeoisie was the vanguard of the revolution. He argued that in Latin America, where there was no actual proletarian leadership, the vanguard was most often made up of the radical intellectual youth. Their duty was to be the "small engine" that sets the "big engine" of mass struggle in motion. This was almost verbatim from Raúl Castro's description of a guerrilla *foco* in Régis Debray's ¿Revolución en las Revoluciones?. [Ref. 10:pp. 75-76]

This theory of a classless struggle clashed with the views of the conservative, pro-Soviet *Partido Comunista de El Salvador* (PCS), who, as late as 1979, advocated a bourgeois victory through broad front unity in the electoral process, despite frustrating defeats in the 1972 and 1977 elections [Ref. 44:p. 129]. This argument had already resulted in the split from the PCS of the Castroite *Fuerzas Populares de Liberación* (FPL) in 1970. In 1975, during the height of Soviet-Cuban rapprochement, Dalton was tried and executed by the Maoist *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP), on charges of being a "Soviet-Cuban and CIA double agent". His followers then left the ERP and formed the *Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional* (FARN). [Ref. 14:p. 801]

In October 1979, alarmed by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran military overthrew the authoritarian regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero. The new government eventually coalesced around the military and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiana* (PDC), who undertook to break up the disproportionately large landholdings of the oligarchy and redistribute them to the tenant farmers. [Ref. 45:p. 7]

Flushed from the Sandinista victory, the Cubans played on the uncertainties of the new Salvador government by calling for unity of all the leftist factions. Meetings were held in Havana in December 1979 and May 1980 to accomplish this aim. The Soviets and the PCS concurred with this strategy. Shafik Handel, secretary general of the PCS, stated in Kommunist, the official Soviet party journal, that "the situation in the country demanded unification of all revolutionary and democratic forces." The PCS also conceded the need for armed insurrection. Moscow was asked to receive 30 Salvadoran students for insurgency training, and helped Handel arrange for promises for arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. [Ref. 14:pp. 79-80]

The result of the drive for unity was the *Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada* (DRU), the executive arm for political and military planning, the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN), the coordinating body

for the guerrillas, and the *Frente Democrático Revolucionario*, (FDR) a front organization to generate sympathy abroad. In May of 1980, the guerrilla leaders met with the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations, the Cuban Chief of Communications, and Fidel himself. In June 1980, they traveled to Nicaragua, and discussed with the Sandinistas their willingness to join in with the Salvadoran struggle. The DRU also used Managua as meeting place with PLO leader Yasir Arafat, who promised them arms and aircraft. [Ref. 45:pp. 2-7]

In August 1980, Cuba began to receive the arms promised by Ethiopia and Vietnam, and to transship them to the guerrillas via Nicaragua. Nearly 200 of the 800 tons promised, and \$500,000 from Iraq reached the FMLN by means of air, sea, and land routes through Honduras and Costa Rica. In late January 1980, Honduran security forces broke up a Cuban directed infiltration operation involving U.S. M-16's and 81mm mortar rounds captured in Vietnam. [Ref. 45:pp. 2-7]

The failure of the January 1981 guerrilla offensive can be attributed, at least in part, to the inability of Cuba and Nicaragua to deliver all of the promised arms to the guerrillas. In February, the DRU returned to Havana to reassess their strategy, but the FMLN may have been distrustful of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan triad [Ref. 14:p.

801. With the denunciation of Cuban interference by the other Central American States in the spring, the Cuban offensive in El Salvador lost its momentum.

Although the guerrillas still advocate armed struggle, they have been careful to back away from overt association with communism. The Programmatic Platform of the FDR claims to advocate agrarian reform, an army made up of honest elements of the existing force and ex-guerrillas, a "broad political and social base," self-determination, and independence from the United States. In February 1982, Salvador Cayetano Carpio of the FMLN, stated that "we don't believe that the broad program has anything to do with Socialism or a Socialist government." [Ref. 44:p. 142]

Continued Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement with the guerrillas belies that statement. Fidel directed the attempted disruption of the March 1982 elections. In August 1982, Alejandro Montenegro, an FMLN leader captured in Honduras, confirmed that Nicaragua is now the primary source of arms for the guerrillas. In a broadcast in 1984, the guerrilla Radio Venceremos claimed:

We are and will continue to be friends of the peoples and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and we are not ashamed of this . . . . We have conducted important logistics operations clandestinely, which have served to provide our forces with arms and ammunition for long periods of time. We have conducted these operations using all the means available, and, therefore, have used the entire Central American region and other countries. [Ref. 46:p. 43]

In July 1984, in a document captured by the Salvadoran Army,

the guerrillas stated that they regarded Nicaragua, Cuba, and the USSR as the "strategic rear guard essential for the logistical flow and financial resources." [Ref. 47] Another set of documents taken in 1985 confirmed that guerrillas were being trained in Vietnam, Bulgaria, and the USSR, and that the Sandinistas were considered the rebels' closest ally. The documents also indicated that the Nicaraguans were planning to expell Salvadoran rebels and cut off their aid in November 1983, fearing a U.S. invasion. Evidently the Salvadorans then appealed to Fidel for help in mediating the situation. [Ref. 48]

The FMLN has been frustrated, but not stopped, by the success of the Duarte government. Their current tactics include urban terror; discrediting the electoral process; and sabotage of bridges, electrical towers, and cash crops as a means of destroying the economic infrastructure of the state. The FDR attempts to accelerate the process by the international use of propaganda and disinformation. [Ref. 34:pp. 33-36] Overtures by Duarte to reach an accommodation with the estimated 11,000 guerrillas have so far met with disappointing results. With 40 percent of the work force either unemployed or earning below the poverty level, and a persistent problem with right-wing death squads, Duarte's government is still at risk. [Ref. 49]

The latest guerrilla offensive has taken on a precise anti-United States flavor with the murder of six U.S.

citizens and seven others on June 19, 1985. An FMLN communique claims the attack "constitutes a just action in defense of our people and our sovereignty." [Ref. 50] Given Fidel's current fears of the Reagan administration, it is unlikely that he is directly responsible for this move. More than likely it is a desperate attempt by the guerrillas to create an atmosphere of uncertainty in El Salvador, and to generate opposition in the United States to increased military involvement in the region. If they succeed in doing so, the Cubans and the Nicaraguans may find more favorable conditions for a renewed effort to topple the moderate elements in power. For the time being, Fidel seems content to have the Nicaraguans take the brunt of U.S. criticism, though in the long run it may detract from his revolutionary standing in Soviet eyes.

#### C. GUATEMALA

The leftist forces in Guatemala have been rife with factionalism since the 1960's, much to Cuban dismay. Attempts at unity have been largely ineffective. In 1962, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) was established, consisting of members from the Alejandro de León-13 November Revolutionary Movement (MR-13), the "20 October" forces of the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), and the "12 April" student group. The leaders included Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, originally with the MR-13. Turcios was an



active participant in the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, but died in an automobile accident soon after. Yon Sosa eventually left the FAR to lead the independent Maoist MR-13. [Ref. 10:p. 112]

The FAR formalized their split from the pro-Soviet PGT in 1967. César Montes, then leader of the FAR, claimed:

The FAR is not the armed arm of the PGT . . . we Guatemalans want to be able to control ourselves without any foreign military, economic, or political intervention. We are creating the people's organization for the revolutionary war: within the guerrilla is the germ of the great people's army which ultimately will be able to offer a power alternative. [Ref. 51]

The FAR was convinced that armed struggle was the only option available, and did not believe the united front tactics of the PGT were serious revolutionary attempts. Ironically, in the wake of Che's defeat in Bolivia and Soviet-Cuban rapprochement, the Cubans found themselves more closely aligned to the PGT than to the Castroite FAR. The MR-13 advocated a worker-peasant government that followed the Cuban example more closely than either the FAR or PGT, but the group disbanded in 1970 after Yon Sosa's death. [Ref. 10:pp. 113-15]

Although chiefly rural at first, guerrilla activity in the late 1960's had shifted to a program of urban terror in Guatemala City. In 1968, insurgents assassinated the U.S. Ambassador, and then the West German Ambassador in 1970. A right-wing backlash and the lack of effective leadership suppressed the waging of a coherent guerrilla offensive in

the 1970's, though terror and counterterror from both the right and the left continued. [Ref. 10:p. 116]

In November of 1980 Fidel sent Manuel Piñeiro Losada, chief of the America's Department, and Ramiro Jesus Abreu of the PCC to Managua to meet with Guatemalan guerrilla leaders. As a result of the meeting, the FAR, the Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (ORPA), the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), and dissident members of the PGT signed a fragile unity accord. The agreement set the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state as its goal. Cuban aid to the guerrillas was stepped up. At least 22 Guatemalans attended a seven-month heavy-weapons training course in Cuba. Cuban-directed arms shipments reached the guerrilla forces by way of Nicaragua and Honduras. These included 50mm mortars, submachineguns, rocket launchers, and M-16's traced back to Vietnam. [Ref. 14:p. 44; Ref. 46:p. 44]

By mid-1981, the PGT had finally committed itself to armed struggle; and in January 1982, Fidel succeeded in sufficiently smoothing over the ideological inconsistencies to unite the four groups into the Revolutionary Guatemalan National Unity [Ref. 52:p. 368]. Although political unity is still a major problem, the guerrillas have established a General Revolutionary Command to plan military strategy and to prolong the armed struggle. They also have ties with front organizations and international solidarity networks in

the Americas and in Europe. This is in keeping with an awareness to maintain a broad front which includes links with the media, liberation theologians of all denominations, trade unions, and human rights organizations.

[Ref. 46:p. 44]

The guerrillas operate out of the northern mountains near the Mexican border. Many of the the 100,000 refugees from the struggle have settled in southern Mexico, where there is widespread sympathy for the rebel cause. Because the guerrillas use this area for rest and regroupment, the Guatemalan Army has periodically struck at them from across the border. Reportedly this has resulted in the death of several Mexican soldiers, and has worsened Guatemalan-Mexican relations. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid has actively sought agreements with the Guatemalan junta to prevent further incursions and to ease the tension in the area. [Ref. 53]

For their own part, the Guatemalan junta is allowing the country to return to civilian rule. On July 1, 1984, 88 legislators were elected to a constituent assembly empowered to write a new constitution. Carpio Nicolle, leader of the newly formed National Union of the Center, is seeking election to the Presidency on a platform of increased U.S. economic aid to his country, and demilitarization of the region as a whole. [Ref. 54]

The junta has reduced the rebel forces from a high of 4,000 guerrillas in 1982 to 2,500 operating out of remote areas. This was done, without U.S military assistance, in an army campaign that combined tough tactics and pacification drives to wean the rural populace from providing shelter and support to the rebels. Peasants were given food and work in exchange for service in local militias and work on military projects. [Ref. 55]

Elections are scheduled for October 27, 1985. Most of the military support the move to civilian rule, in order to acquire foreign aid and credits. The country will still face an economic crisis (the foreign debt is \$2.5 billion, with 40 percent of the work force jobless or underemployed), but prospects are poor for a resurgence of the Marxist offensive. [Ref. 55] Guatemala provides a good case for the use of military persistence, combined with a shift to centrist policies, as a counter to Cuban efforts to unify rebel forces.

#### D. HONDURAS

Honduran insurgents were targeted for "active support" at the Conference for Latin American Communists, held in Havana in 1964 [Ref. 10:p. 79], but Cuban ties with the radicals did not solidify until the late 1970's. Members of the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) were recruited and trained by Cubans to participate in the "Internationalist

Brigade" during the Sandinista revolution. After the conflict, some of the Hondurans received further guerrilla training in Cuba. [Ref. 31]

During the Cuban offensive in the early 1980's, Honduras was used as a conduit for arms and aid to guerrillas in Guatemala and El Salvador. In January 1981, an arms cache including M-16's from Vietnam was uncovered by Honduran officials. On November 27, 1981, a safehouse on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa was raided. Two guerrillas, including a Uruguayan, were killed, and Nicaraguans were among those captured. Automatic weapons, explosives, and documents indicating attendance at training courses in Cuba, were confiscated. One of the Honduran guerrillas told reporters that the group had been headed for El Salvador. Two additional safehouses in La Cieba and San Pedro Sula were uncovered two days later. [Ref. 31]

Efforts were also taken to generate an effective insurgent force to operate against the Honduran government. In the spring of 1981, a Honduran jet was hijacked in Managua by five terrorists, who demanded the release of 15 leftists imprisoned in Honduras. Ten were eventually released in exchange for the 56 hostages, and with the hijackers, traveled to Cuba via Panama. [Ref. 56] During the November raids, evidence came to light that high-level Sandinistas had instigated the formation of the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH). In the

Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo Diario, an FMLH leader described the group as part of the "increasing regionalization of the Central American conflict." The groups' chief of operations resides in Managua, and its members receive training in Nicaragua and in Cuba.

[Ref. 46:p. 44]

Between 1981 and 1983, FMLH strategy was mostly limited to bombing attacks in Tegucigalpa, much of it with the assistance of their Salvadoran counterparts. Captured terrorists have confessed that their explosives came from Nicaragua. Other evidence indicated Cuban involvement in the seizure of 108 hostages in San Pedro Sula in September 1983. [Ref. 46:p. 44]

In March 1983, formation was announced of a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board, comprising four extremist groups. In the April 21 issue of Barricada in Nicaragua, their program of "Popular Revolutionary War" called for the Honduran people to rise up against the government and the U.S. presence. On July 19, 96 Honduran guerrillas entered Olancho Department from Nicaragua. The raid was unsuccessful, and 24 captured guerrillas and deserters testified to their recruitment and training. They had been told they would receive training in mechanics or agriculture in Nicaragua, but were subsequently sent to Cuba. At the guerrilla training camp in Pinar del Rio, they were given four to six months of instruction in ideology, weapons,

intelligence, and military tactics. Salvadoran and Guatemalan trainees were also present. Some were made to do "volunteer labor" at farms or work as servants in state guest houses. Additional training was given in Nicaragua prior to launching the raid. [Ref. 46:p. 44] At least in part, the attempt failed due to lack of popular support throughout the rural populace. A similiar guerrilla group repeated their effort in 1984, also without success [Ref. 34:p. 38].

With the fear of an invasion from Nicaragua averted, the Honduran government sought to forge a new bilateral security agreement and a doubling of economic aid from the United States. Hondurans also expressed concern that the U.S. policy of basing anti-Sandinista *contras* in Honduras might elicit more trouble from Nicaragua, or that Washington and Managua might strike a separate deal that would leave them unable to defend themselves against Sandinista retribution. Top *contra* leaders were ordered out of Tegucigalpa, and forced to relocate their hospitals and facilities in remote areas. The Hondurans are also wary of a U.S.-armed force in El Salvador; border disputes that erupted into war between the two in 1969 still remain unresolved. [Ref. 57]

Despite pledges to defend Honduras from any attack, the Reagan administration has refused to negotiate a separate security agreement with them, claiming that the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter contain adequate defense provisions.

Current budget proposals before Congress include a 6 percent increase in economic aid to \$142.9 million, and a 42 percent increase in military aid to \$88.2 million. [Ref. 58] Many Hondurans argue that the United States has stressed military aid at the expense of economic development; and an internal dispute over nominating procedures threatens to jeopardize the upcoming November elections. [Ref. 59]

Ramón Valladares Soto, Liberal Party activist and Chief Justice of the Honduran Supreme Court, is currently in jail on charges of treason. His wife has personal ties with Sandinista leaders, and has been involved with negotiations to release Honduran fishermen periodically captured by FSLN forces. Although comfortably provided for, his imprisonment has become an issue of the worsening political crisis. The country's Roman Catholic Church has also become involved in criticism of the government infighting. [Ref. 60] Given the strength and popularity of the army, the possibility of a military coup prior to the elections cannot be ruled out [Ref. 61]. Should that happen, there could be a leftist backlash that would attempt to place the blame on U.S. policy.

This would present an ideal situation for the insurgents, who could use popular discontent to renew the revolutionary offensive and to expel both the U.S. military presence and the *contras*, supposedly to stabilize the border crisis with Nicaragua. With Honduras neutralized, it again



could be used as a conduit for arms to the Salvadoran insurgents; and should the Honduran-Salvadoran conflict reemerge, the Sandinistas could even provide Honduras with "fraternal assistance" to protect them from the U.S. trained Salvadoran forces.

In short, the Nicaraguans and the Cubans have nothing to lose and everything to gain by exacerbating any internal conflict within the government of Honduras. In the face of strong U.S. support, the strategy only may be to use propaganda among the international media and liberation theologians, but low-level terror and urban violence may erupt again as the elections draw nearer. Although all of Honduras is hoping for an honest, forthright electoral process, a leading figure in the opposition National Party admits that "the prospect for elections is one of political chaos." [Ref. 61]

#### E. COSTA RICA

Up until 1981, Costa Rica was used at various times as a staging ground for leftist aggression toward its neighbors. Costa Rica itself was the target of a successful attack by the Social Democratic Caribbean Legion, of which Fidel was the only Communist member, in 1948. In 1959, while Cuban-based Nicaraguan exiles plotted an attack on Luis Somoza's regime, another group of exiles launched an attack from Costa Rica. The failure of that mission caused

the group in Cuba to abandon their own plans.

[Ref. 21:p. 10-12]

Since the establishment of the social democratic government, Costa Rica has been one of the most politically stable countries in Latin America. But, with a soaring foreign debt and the lack of a standing army, it is not without its share of problems. The 8,000 members of the Civil Guard and the Rural Guard are poorly trained and ill-equipped; and their employment status is highly dependent on the political party in power. The Communist People's Vanguard Party is illegal, but it has operated through front groups and sympathetic parties in attempts to influence the government. [Ref. 10:p. 69; Ref. 62]

Combined with longstanding disputes with Nicaragua under the Somozas, these factors led to a large amount of sympathy for the Sandinista cause. The Cubans utilized San José as the base for their FSLN operations in 1978-1979, but the Costa Ricans were embarrassed by the turn of events in Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to power. They were equally suspicious of the Soviet actions in their own country, accusing them of interference in local labor problems. The Costa Ricans also sided with the military junta in the San Salvador. When evidence came to light that the Cubans were utilizing the San José network to supply the Salvadoran guerrillas, Costa Rica broke consular relations with Cuba on May 11, 1981. They also expressed displeasure

with the Soviets by abrogating a technical and economic agreement that provided for training by Soviet experts.

[Ref. 14:p. 97]

With the help of Nicaragua and the Soviets, Cuba responded by attempting to discredit Costa Rican democracy in international forums, and by waging a reign of terror against the Costa Rican people. In July 1982, the Honduran Airline office in San José was bombed by a terrorist recruited and trained by Nicaraguan diplomats in-country. The accused diplomats were declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Costa Rica. According to the terrorist, the bombing was only one facet of a Nicaraguan plan that included sabotage, kidnapping, bank robberies, and other acts meant to expose internal instabilities in Costa Rica. Subsequently, several guerrilla arms caches and safe houses were discovered. [Ref. 46:pp. 44-45]

In 1983, Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge requested that his country become a site for transmission of the Voice of America into Nicaragua. The deal was finalized in September 1984 with a private business group for \$3.2 million. Monge fully approved of the arrangement, despite some internal opposition. [Ref. 63] By spring 1985, Nicaraguan-Costa Rican relations definitely had worsened. Sixteen of the 49 Nicaraguan diplomats in San Jose had been expelled [Ref. 64]. In June, a violent demonstration by 500 Costa Ricans was staged at the Nicaraguan Embassy, in

protest of the May 31st border incident in which two Costa Rican guards were killed. Monge has asked the OAS to investigate the incident, and is considering invoking the 1947 Rio Treaty in response to Nicaraguan aggression.

[Ref. 65]

Costa Rica has long advocated democracy and pluralism in the region, but as yet is a cautious participant in the Contadora process. In contrast to Cuba position, Costa Rica fears Nicaraguan participation in negotiations. Unable to provide for its own defense against the Sandinista Army, any agreement that freezes the Central American arms race at its present level would leave Costa Rica in a very vulnerable position. Other Central American countries, like Honduras, see Costa Rican military weakness as incentive for them to abandon the process and strike a separate deal with Managua.

[Ref. 66]

#### F. COLOMBIA

The first Castroite guerrilla group to operate in Colombia was the National Liberation Army (ELN), formed by Fabio Vásquez in July 1964. The small group subscribed to a strict *foco* theory of a peasant struggle in the countryside. Vásquez was an idealist, like Che, and believed that a guerrilla leader must have a true moral character and great compassion for the peasant and his cause. Although the ELN supported the Cuban revolution without question, they were

not Marxists, and were somewhat critical of established pro-Soviet Communist Parties. The group was all but destroyed by government forces by the mid-1970's.

[Ref. 10:pp. 118-21]

Having severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, Columbia re-established them in 1975 in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence." Relations remained close during the next four years; Colombia even sent volunteers to fight for the Sandinistas in the "International Brigade." But, relations deteriorated in 1979 when Colombia opposed Cuba for the United Nations Security Council seat. Castro went so far as to blame Colombia, instead of the Angola intervention, for his defeat. [Ref. 14:pp. 89-91]

The following year the April 19 Movement (M-19), a guerrilla group that Cuba had trained in the 1970's, siezed a group of diplomats at the Dominican Embassy in Bogota. After a negotiated release, the guerrillas were granted asylum in Havana, where they received further training to initiate a Cuban-assisted offensive against the Colombian government. A cadre of 100 Cuban-trained guerrillas were sent to Panama and traveled by boat to Colombia in February 1981. The cadre's attempt to create a people's army was a failure, and the Cuban complicity was made public. As a result, Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba on March 23, 1981. [Ref. 14:pp. 89-91]

The offensive included the use of Colombian drug dealers, whose proceeds helped finance arms for the M-19. Jaime Guillot-Lara, a major narcotics and arms trafficker and a personal friend of Jaime Bateman, leader of the M-19, was introduced by trafficker Johnny Crump to Cuban officials in Colombia in late 1979. The officials were Fernando Ravelo-Reneda, the Cuban Ambassador-Plenipotentiary, and Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, the Cuban Minister-Counselor. The possibility of using Cuba as an intermediate haven for drug shipments into South Florida was discussed. In July 1980, Guillot met again with the Cubans, this time accompanied by Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, member of the Central Committee of the PCC and President of the Cuban Institute of Friendship to the People (ICAP). An agreement was struck where Guillot would pay the Cubans for assistance in his smuggling operations, and Cuba would pay him for weapons shipments to the M-19. [Ref. 67:pp. 82-82]

In 1980 and 1981, Guillot moved marijuana, cocaine, and methaqualone tablets to the Cuban port of Paredon Grande, where he would transfer the drugs to Miami-based traffickers. Some of these dealers were DGI agents placed there during the Mariel boatlift to subvert anti-Castro groups in the United States. While in Cuban waters the smugglers received protection from Cuban gunboats, under the direct orders of Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Vice Admiral of

the Cuban Navy. Guillot would then return to Colombia with arms purchased in Miami for the M-19. [Ref. 67:pp. 82-83]

The arrangement provided Cuba not only with the expertise of established drug and arms networks, but also with hard currency. It was also totally in keeping with the DGI task of subverting the United States from within. A DGI agent involved in the Guillot network testified in 1983 that his job was "to load up the United States with drugs." At one point, Rene Rogriguez Cruz put his arm on the agent's shoulder and said, "we are finally going to have a drugstore in the United States". [Ref. 67:pp. 44-45]

In November 1981, one of Guillot's boats, the Katrina, was sunk, and another, the Monarca, was siezed by the Colombian Navy and security forces. At least 100 tons of weapons destined for the M-19 were lost with the Katrina, but an undisclosed amount made it to the guerrillas on shore. Guillot was arrested in Mexico City, but extradition efforts by both Colombia and the United States failed, and he was released a year later. The United States indicted Guillot and 13 others, including the four Cubans, with a litany of smuggling and narcotics offenses. Cuba denounced the indictments, and the four, along with one other and Guillot, remain fugitives. [Ref. 67:pp. 84-85]

In August 1982, Belisario Betancur was elected President of Colombia. Since then he has attempted to build broad public support for a middle ground between the leftist

guerrilla movements and his own Conservative Party. He immediately lifted the state of siege imposed by Ayala, and promoted a general amnesty that resulted in some 2,000 guerrillas laying down their arms and rejoining society. In March 1984, a truce was signed between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), whose members number about 15,000. In August 1984, additional truces were signed with the 8,000 members of the M-19, the Maoist People's Liberation Army (about 3,000 members), and the Worker's Self-Defense group of about 500 members. [Ref. 68]

Still the situation is far from resolved. The ELN and the Maoist MAO have stated in communiques that they will never sign a truce [Ref. 68]. The Colombian economy is in recession, and U.S. banks have been reluctant to refinance its foreign debt (\$10.5 million in 1984) [Ref. 69]. The continued involvement of drug traffickers with guerrilla groups has resulted in a high incidence of drug-related violence, including the assassination of the Minister of Justice in April 1984. The resulting crackdown on the traffickers is proving costly, and may serve to alienate the peasantry, for whom marijuana cultivation is a prime source of income. [Ref. 70]

Betancur is one of the more credible proponents of the Contadora initiatives, and speaks against the continuation of aid to the *contras*. Despite the recent history of Cuban subversion in his country, he appears more than willing to



extend the Contadora dialogue to include Cuba. He and Fidel speak regularly by telephone, and Colombia's Foreign Minister, Augusto Ramirez-Ocampo, has traveled to Havana to meet with Fidel, and possibly Daniel Ortega Saavedra as well. [Ref. 71]

In November 1983, Betancur's brother was kidnapped by guerrillas. It was through Fidel's mediation that he was eventually released. [Ref. 34: p 38] It is entirely possible that Fidel could also have had a hand in arranging the guerrilla truces, to gain Betancur's support in the Contadora process, or to mollify the Soviets, who enjoy normal relations with Colombia. He can certainly use such a champion in light of U.S. criticism. But Betancur's accommodations to Cuba could be short-lived. If a major offensive by the independent guerrilla groups is launched, he may be forced to use repressive tactics, which might in turn mobilize the M-19 and the FARC. Should Betancur, for any reason, withdraw his support for Cuba in the Contadora process, the events of 1979-1981 may repeat themselves. Betancur would be remiss to forget the lessons of Cuban duplicity learned by his predecessor.

#### IV. THE CUBAN OFFENSIVE IN THE CARIBBEAN: 1978-1983

In the 1970's the Caribbean looked very promising as a region in which to expand Cuban influence. Many of the islands were speculating about socialism as a viable model, and Cuba could maintain the appearance of an independent foreign policy because of its own proximity and the geographical distance from Moscow. It was also an arena where Cuba could show its defiance to Washington. In October of 1972, despite the OAS ban, the Caribbean states of Jamaica, Trinidad/Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados jointly declared their intentions to establish diplomatic ties with Cuba. Castro hailed this as a "challenge to imperialism" which showed that,

. . . the English speaking nations of the Caribbean did not acquire the bad habit, as had the Latin American governments, of being dreadfully afraid of Yankee imperialism. [Ref. 72]

That same year Castro denounced the "colonial" nature of the United States' relationship with Puerto Rico before the U.N. Committee of Decolonization. In 1975, he solidified his stance at the Havana Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Communist Parties. Delegates from the Communist Parties of Puerto Rico, Martinique, Haiti, Guadeloupe, the Dominican Republic, and Guyana were present. Criticism was not restricted to the U.S.; both Great Britain and France

were also called upon to relinquish their colonies in the region. [Ref. 10:pp. 217-18; Ref. 73:pp. 78-80]

Cuban Caribbean strategy in the 1970's seem to be designed to promote state-to-state relations with existing governments, rather than with spreading revolution. Fidel began promoting anti-imperialist economic cooperation between Cuba and the other microstates by participation in the Caribbean Community and the Joint Caribbean Shipping Company. In 1975, he helped create the Latin American Economic System as a regional economic platform that excluded the United States. [Ref. 52:p. 361]

Therefore, by the late 1970's, Cuba was viewed positively by the underdeveloped Caribbean states. Fidel may have given a superficial impression of Cuba as a great success story, with a healthy economy independent of Washington, if not from Moscow.

#### A. GRENADA

In March 1979, a left-wing coup in Grenada replaced Eric Gairy's conservative regime with Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM). Almost immediately Bishop sought to establish a close relationship with Havana. By fervently embracing Fidel on the podium at the United Nations in November 1979, Bishop left little doubt as to where his sympathies lay. [Ref. 21:pp. 240-41]

In response to Bishop's request for help in defending against a counter coup [Ref. 13:p. 180], Cuba signed a protocol providing Grenada with light arms and 40 military advisers. The advisers' duties were to assist the Grenadian military in such areas as organization, training, preparation of "cadres and minor specialists," and plans for defense of the country. The People's Republic of Grenada (PRG) would provide facilities for the Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, who would oversee the Cuban mission. The permanency of the military personnel and their activities was to remain secret. The protocol also provided for scholarships for an undetermined number of Grenadian military personnel to the Military Training Centers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Cuba. Cuba would also receive four delegations of up to three Grenadians each for three-month courses in engineering, communications, logistics, and exploration. [Ref. 74:pp. 16.1-5]

The protocol was to remain in effect until December 31, 1984, and clearly shows the Cuban intention to monitor and control the development of the Grenadian Armed Forces, and Cuba's attempts to extend its control in such situations with a minimum of real cost. Annex 2 to the protocol states that essentially Grenada would underwrite all expenses except for materials to construct housing for the Cubans, dried foodstuffs, and uniforms. [Ref. 74:pp. 16.1-5]

Bishop's rush to embrace Castro and Cuban aid was more of a calculated, pragmatic move to ensure his own survival, than a burning desire to emulate the Cuban experience or to revive the ideology of the *fidelistas*. By Bishop's own admission in his "Line of March," the Grenadian Revolution inherited a "backward, undeveloped economy, with . . . a primitive level of technological and economic development." [Ref. 74:pp. 1.3-5] The class structure was undeveloped, with a small working class, and a predominant rural petit bourgeoisie. Bishop acknowledged that such a system was detrimental to their cause, that theoretically only the working class, led by a Marxist-Leninist vanguard, could build a Socialist State. To work within the confines of the present situation, it would be necessary to form an alliance with all progressive elements struggling to build a Socialist State as rapidly and scientifically as possible [Ref. 74:pp. 1.8-9], thereby accepting the Soviet model of revolution over the Castroist interpretation.

As Bishop saw it, the situation on March 13, 1979 when the NJM took power, was that there had been a noticeable shift in power to the petit bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and that it was necessary for a more ideologically and politically developed group to lead the anti-imperialist struggle [Ref. 74:pp. 1.15-16]. The NJM decided, however, to keep its Marxist-Leninist nature closely held so as to prevent a bourgeoisie counter coup as happened in Gambia [Ref.

74:p. 1.8]. This advice may have come directly from Fidel, who had given similar advice to the Sandinistas, but at no point in the "Line of March" does Bishop mention Cuba or the validity of the Cuban model.

Bishop utilized Cuba as the means to cultivate the attention and favors of the Soviets. In agreements signed in Havana in 1980, 1981, and 1982, the USSR promised Grenada 15,000,000 roubles worth of equipment during 1980-1985, including artillery and small arms, antitank and antiaircraft armament, communication means, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles, and ammunition. All materials were to be sent to Cuba, with final delivery arranged between Cuba and Grenada. The agreements also provided for technical assistance upon request, and for training Grenadian servicemen in the USSR.

[Ref. 74:pp. 13.1-6, 14.1-12, 15.1-3]

The Grenadians also used Havana as a forum through which to curry support from other Communist States. At the 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Bishop asked Vietnam to provide military training to Grenada. They agreed to receive 20 Grenadians in April 1982 to be trained in "anti-chemical warfare," "anti-radioactivity warfare," "re-education of anti-social and counter-revolutionary elements," and "Yankee tactics and the weapons used in Vietnam." The Grenadians also requested pilot training, but the Vietnamese turned them down. [Ref. 74:p. 18.1]

The most obvious manifestation of the militarization of Grenada was the construction of the International Airport. If there was any doubt as to the eventual purpose of the airport, it was not in the minds of the Bishop regime. A page from the notebook of General Hudson Austin's deputy, Liam James, dated 22 March 1980, states unequivocally that the airport would be used by Cuban and Soviet forces [Ref. 74:p. 23.1]. Nor did the Cubans appear to have any doubt about the matter. During a 1982 discussion between the Director of Cubana and Leon Cornwall, Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba, the director "expressed a request for special fueling concessions to be granted to them upon the completion of the International Airport." The Grenadians indicated that they were aware the request was coming from Moscow. [Ref. 74:p. 87.4]

By 1983, the Soviets appeared to be convinced that Grenada constituted an integral part of their strategy in the Western Hemisphere. In a meeting in Moscow, Marshall Ugarkov boasted to Major Einstein Louison, Chief of Staff of the Grenadian Army, that "over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." [Ref. 74:p. 24.2] In another meeting between Bishop and the Soviet Ambassador, the Soviets agreed to deliver supplies, including two patrol boats, and foostuffs directly to Grenada. At least one, and possibly five, planes capable of

paratroop transport would be delivered to Grenada via Cuba. The planes would be flown by Cuban pilots, and Soviet technicians would provide maintenance in Havana.

[Ref. 74:pp. 21.1-3]

As Soviet-Grenadian relations solidified, it appears that Cuba's role as mediator may have diminished. In at least one instance, the Soviets evidently neglected to inform the Cubans of either the decision to build a new NJM headquarters or that the PCC was to supply the construction materials. Whether this was merely an oversight by the Soviets is unclear. [Ref. 74:p. 29.3]

Back in Grenada, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) was beginning to acknowledge that there was some friction between the Cubans and the Grenadian people. Altercations erupted between Grenadian and Cuban workers at the International Airport [Ref. 74:p. 77.1]. Eight of the ten fishing boats donated to Grenada by Cuba were totally unusable, and the other two were barely operable, despite Cuban promises to revitalize the local fishing industry [Ref. 74:p. 80.1]. In addition, 97 Grenadian economic students in schools in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Camaguey were found to be politically indifferent, and it appears were forced into "voluntary productive work" to regain their political consciousness [Ref. 74:pp. 19.1-6].

Despite these grumblings the PRG was reluctant to find too much fault with the Cubans. Linking the continuation of



Soviet support to the fact that "Cuba strongly championed our cause." [Ref. 74:p. 26.3] This left the Cubans in a position to influence the Grenadians on a number of different fronts, including internal security affairs, relations with other Latin American countries (particularly Nicaragua), relations with the United States, and participation in international forums, such as the Socialist International and the World Peace Movement.

Concerned with reactionary elements in the Catholic Church, the Cubans sent a delegation to Grenada in August 1982 to assess the position of the Churches of Grenada toward the PRG. Of note in its recommendations was a referral to a Cuban interest in keeping close tabs on Catholic Church actions originating from Pope John Paul's criticism of socialism in Central America and the Caribbean. Both a bilateral exchange between the NJM-PCC and a trilateral one including the FSLN were recommended. Training of the Grenadian individual appointed to observe Church activities and work with "collaborators from Christian organizations" would be carried out in Cuba, where he would be briefed on Cuban experiences, and trained in the "tasks of systematic information." Another recommendation was to expose Grenadian clergymen and laity to their counterparts in Nicaragua and other Latin American groups dedicated to the "theology of liberation and . . . a church committed to the revolutionary positions." [Ref. 74:pp.

2.8-101 The Grenadians apparently took the recommendations to heart. By the summer of 1983, Church activities were closely monitored, clergymen were encouraged to visit Cuba, and talks with Nicaraguans and Cubans about starting a "progressive" church were being planned [Ref. 74: p. 5.5].

From the beginning of the Bishop regime, the Grenadian's had sought to become politically active in the rest of Latin America. Grenada saw its main contribution to Latin America as the movement to designate the Carribean as a "Zone of Peace," which was adopted at the OAS Assembly in 1979 at La Paz, Bolivia [Ref. 74:p. 106.5]. The Grenadian's were obviously aware that continued attention from the Soviets hinged on an active regional role. The Grenadian Ambassador to Moscow, W. Richard Jacobs, believed that exerting influence on Suriname and Belize would gain them prestige in the Soviet eyes [Ref. 74:p. 26.6]. This attitude coincided with the Cuban desire to reassert itself in the Caribbean Basin. The Cubans were also responsible for orchestrating Grenadian-Nicaraguan relations. They arranged for Grenada to send 40 schoolteachers to Nicaragua to assist in the literacy program, as well as to provide ideological training [Ref. 74:p. 76.1]. By 1982, other leftist groups in the region were seeking support from Grenada. Ralph Gonsalves, leader of the Movement for National Unity in St. Vincent's, asked to come to Grenada to establish fraternal links with

the NJM. Columbia's M-19 also sent greetings to the NJM and asked to develop ties with them. [Ref. 74:pp. 87.2-3]

A Cooperation and Exchange Plan between the Communist Party of Cuba and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada, signed in 1983, solidified their joint commitment to the region. The document addresses the "spirit of cooperation, solidarity, and internationalism" of the two parties. It provides for the furthering of revolutionary struggles in the Caribbean by schooling five NJM comrades in the "Nico Lopez" school for one year, and another 19 to receive training in Cuba on a variety of press-related topics, Caribbean affairs, propaganda, and religion. Nine Cuban advisors in these fields would train Grenadians at home. The ultimate goal of these exchanges would be to strengthen both parties' ties to other socialist and progressive countries, particularly their standings within the Movement of Nonaligned States. Other exchanges would be made within the Workers' Central Union of Cuba, the Cuban Women's Federation, the Association of Small Farmers, and the Young Communist Organization. The Cuban signator of the document was Manuel Piñeiro Losada, head of the Americas Department. [Ref. 74:pp. 7, 17.1-7]

The Cubans also coached Maurice Bishop as to the conduct of his affairs with the United States. Gail Reed Rizo, ex-Venceremos Brigade member, and wife of the Cuban Ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres Rizo, provided Bishop

with guidance for his visit to the U.S. in 1983. This guidance included ways to handle media coverage and utilize it to his advantage, especially to convince the U.S. people of the normal tourist uses of the projected airport, and to win the support of the Black Caucus. She recommended that if problems arose while in Washington, Bishop should defer to the advice of Ramon Sanchez-Parodi of the Cuban Interests Section. [Ref. 74:pp. 7-8, 31.1-4]

If indeed Cuba was fading in its role as negotiator between Grenada and the USSR, it certainly continued to assert itself in determining Grenada's stance in the Third World. Godwin Horsford, the Grenadian delegate to a conference on solidarity with El Salvador in June 1983, was surprised to learn upon his arrival in Cuba that he and other Caribbean delegates were going to Libya for a Congress of the World Center for the Resistance of Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, and Reaction. The delegates (from Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad/Tobago) were informed by the PCC as to what positions they were to take at the Congress. They were told to "avoid giving support for the idea of Libya being the center of the World anti-imperialist struggle and its military implications of a rapid deployment force against imperialism," and merely to give a show of solidarity to the proposed World Center. In addition the center should include Latin American and Caribbean

representation. The PCC itself would only be an informal participant at the conference. [Ref. 74:pp. 34.1-5]

Privately, Horsford and the other delegates expressed concern over Cuba's decision to take a "low profile" since they viewed Cuba as the "leader of the Revolutionary Movement in this part of the World." The fact that Cuba misled the delegates as to the true purpose of the Congress almost backfired when they found themselves in disagreement with Arab and African delegates over ratification of the charter. The Arabs and Africans claimed that since the Caribbean delegates had planned to come to a conference on El Salvador, they had no mandate from their respective organizations to commit themselves to the proposed center. Calmer heads prevailed, however, and Cuba, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua were nominated for membership in the Secretariat. (El Salvador and Nicaragua subsequently withdrew and proposed Guatemala instead.) Cuba was chosen as a member of the Executive Committee, along with Benin, Iran, Syria, and Libya. The Cubans dictated the Grenadian stance throughout the entire conference.

[Ref. 74: 34.1-5]

Likewise, the Grenadian delegates to the World Conference of Women and Women's International Democratic Federation Congress first traveled to Cuba where they were briefed at the International Affairs Department as to the position to take at the conference -- namely, an anti-U.S.

stance with the aim of drawing the socialist camp closer to the "progressive organizations of the Third World." The delegates followed the Cuban advice and developed close working ties with the delegates from East Europe.

[Ref. 74:pp. 71.1-4]

Of special note is Cuba's attempts to influence organizations of which it is not a member, such as the Socialist International (SI). The SI's 1962 charter declines membership to Communist "one party dictatorships." Nevertheless, its forum for progressive elements in both the Third World and major industrialized states provides a tempting target for Cuban influence, especially in its consideration of Latin American revolutionary movements. Grenada was accepted as a member in the SI in Madrid in November 1980. [Ref. 74:p. 9] The Grenadians defended their membership on the grounds of the SI's broad ideological stance and its continued support to Latin American States attempting to free themselves from U.S. imperialism. The SI would help Grenada to accomplish legitimacy for itself among the other members, as well as to provide a forum for its foreign policy. [Ref. 74:pp. 38.7-10] The Cubans subsequently utilized Grenada's membership in the SI to covertly influence the organization.

The 13th Congress of the SI in Geneva in 1976 addressed overcoming the organization's Eurocentrism and expansion of its influence into Latin America. The *Partido Revolucionario*

*Dominicano* and the *Partido Liberacion Nacional de Costa Rica* were given full member status. Venezuela's *Accion Democratica* (AD) and *Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo*, and Paraguay's *Partido Revolucionario Feberista* were given consultative status. For the first time, Latin Americans were elected as vice chairmen: Daniel Oduber of the Costa Rican PLN and Anselmo Sule of the *Partido Radical de Chile*. [Ref. 74:p. 36.5]

An analysis entitled "Social Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean" was recovered by U.S. forces in Grenada. The author, believed to be Cuban, concedes that the SI's aim is to bring social democracy to the region as an alternative to "decaying capitalism and 'totalitarian socialism'," but that informal dialogue with the organization allows the participation and influence of powerful leftist groups such as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional de Mexico*, and Venezuela's AD, and also some radical groups like the Argentine Montoneros, the *Partido Socialista Uruguayo*, the *Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Peru*, the Nicaraguan FSLN, and sectors of the *Partido Socialista* of Chile.

[Ref. 74:pp. 36.6-9] In summary the author says:

We see a dual nature in the projection of Social Democracy and the Caribbean. On the one hand, it does represent a permanent enemy of the essential objectives of the Communist and left movements in that this trend intends to prevent the triumph of socialist revolutions and the materialization of the Communist ideal. On the other, it is obvious that certain political positions of the Social Democracy can be used by the revolutionary and progressive forces of the continent at given junctures of

the struggle against the repressive and fascist military regimes and of the confrontation with U.S. imperialism. [Ref. 74:p. 36.14]

If one interprets the above to mean that the Social Democratic movement is at least a step in the right direction, than what the author says next is indicative of the U.S. role in changing the correlation of forces to the left's advantage:

. . . the demagogic policy of "human rights" and of encouragement of "democratic openings" in the countries ruled by repressive military regimes, insistently promoted by Carter's administration in its early years of power, favored the development of Social Democratic policies in the region. To this we must add that it is extremely difficult to conceive of the development of this overall Social Democratic offensive without the consent and encouragement, or at least the implicit tolerance of US imperialism, including a certain amount of political agreement on basic aspects. [Ref. 74:pp. 36.14-15]

In another document, believed to have also been written by a Cuban, the SI was criticized as being unable to carry out the political offensive as conceived by its originators, and that the Latin America issue would be the measure of the organization's willingness to confront the Reagan administration in the 1980's. At the SI Congress in Madrid in 1980, the organization's stance appeared to be one of "expectation and of partial tactical retreat." Nevertheless the author was hopeful that, if given the proper guidance from forces on the left, the SI could be of tactical use in the "people's democratic and anti-imperialist struggle." Indeed, he went on to praise the action of the Congress in regard to the chapter of its resolution that pertained to



Latin America. The final draft included general statements of support for the FSLN and NJM regimes, and warned the U.S. to stop support of the "dictatorial regimes" of El Salvador and Guatemala, and to refrain from attacks on Nicaragua and Grenada. Even though the resolution did not contain support for the revolutionary forces in Puerto Rico, or legitimize the "use of violence when other paths to attain the people's objectives of liberty and social justice are closed," overall the resolution clearly constituted a Cuban victory in a forum in which they had no direct influence.

[Ref. 74:pp. 35.1-2, 35.18-19, 35.24]

The author went on to delineate those within the Latin American delegation whom he considered to be on each side of the revolutionary fence. The "center right sector," made up of Carlos Andrés Perez of the Venezuelan AD, Daniel Oduber, and the Panamanians, agreed with the U.S. analysis of the region, and were actively seeking to reverse the SI stance on El Salvador. The "sector of progressive and revolutionary forces" included Salvadoran representatives of the DRU, FDR, MNR, (especially Manuel Ungo and Hector Oqueli), Bayardo Arce of the FSLN, Jamaica's People's National Party, and the NJM. [Ref. 74:pp. 35.22-23]

The NJM was more than willing to adopt the Cuban line without question. At an emergency SI meeting in Panama on 28 February-1 March, 1981, ex-Deputy Director of the CIA, Vernon Walters, attempted to provide proof of Cuban and

Soviet arms support to MNR, but was refused admittance. When Carlos Andrés Perez of Venezuela condemned Cuba and the Soviet Union for the same, Unison Whiteman of Grenada came to their defense, and succeeded in convincing the SI to adopt a resolution condemning only the U.S. for the militarization of the region. [Ref. 74:pp. 41.1-2]

The Cubans were especially distressed with the moderate bent the SI appeared to be taking towards the Sandinista revolution in a meeting held June 25, 1981, in Managua. Chairman Felipe Gonzales of Spain, along with Carlos Andrés Perez, lobbied against an expression of full solidarity with the revolutionary government, and expressed concern over the influx of Cuban and Soviet arms. Bayardo Arce spoke up in defense of Cuban aid, stating that the revolution had a right to receive assistance from whomever would offer it, alluding to the closed door policy of the U.S. and the military buildup in Honduras. In his analysis of the meeting, Manuel Piñero Losada expressed concern that "right wing elements," that is those members supporting pluralism in Nicaragua, were being pressured by the U.S. either to exert influence on the SI in keeping with a reserved stance towards the Sandinistas. [Ref. 74:pp. 33A.1-3]

As a result, Cuban efforts to influence the organization were redoubled. An unofficial Cuban delegation met with the Grenadian and Nicaraguan delegates prior to the SI meeting in Bonn in April 1982. [Ref. 74:p. 37.1] This session was

more favorable to the Cubans. Despite criticism of the lack of electoral process in Grenada, the Cubans were happy to see conservative voices like Gonzales and Perez "neutralized." [Ref. 74:pp. 37A.2-3]

Criticism of the NJM and Nicaragua made it clear to Cuba that the division between right and left in the SI was growing, and that a broad regional front should be prepared for the upcoming Sydney conference. At a SI bureau meeting in Basle, Switzerland on November 8, 1982, an attempt was made to solidify a leftist SI stance on Latin America. A resolution was drafted for presentation to the upcoming Sydney Congress of the SI in April 1983. Participants in its drafting included Michael Manley, who presented the case for Grenada. The resolution called for the following [Ref. 74:pp. 49.1-7]:

- \* Unconditional support for the MNR in El Salvador.
- \* Condemnation of military aggression against Nicaragua.
- \* Call for electoral process in Nicaragua.
- \* Denunciation of "genocide by the military regime of Guatemala against the Indian population."
- \* Proposal for a conference aimed at "non-intervention, stability, and peace in Central America."
- \* Condemnation of attempts to destabilize Grenada.
- \* Denunciation of the regime of Haiti, and support for opposition forces.
- \* Support for *Partido Independista de Puerto Rico*.

prior to the Sydney Conference, a secret Regional Caucus was held in Managua in January 1983. In light of European factionalism in the SI over the Latin American question, José Ramón Silva of the Central Committee of the PCC, and Chris DeRiggs from the NJM, met with delegates from the FSLN, the Salvadoran MNR, the Chilean RP, and the Jamaican PNP to discuss regional strategy -- namely a solidarity platform on a number of issues. These would include support for the Basle Resolution, initiatives to support Suriname, and ways to counter opposition forces within the SI of Portugal, Italy, and the U.S., whose delegates were assumed to be CIA plants. [Ref. 74:pp. 39.1-3]

The Cubans also drew the Grenadians into an active role in the World Peace Movement, especially on a regional level. At a meeting of the World Peace Council in Lisbon in 1982, Bernard Bourne, Minister-Counsellor of Grenada, assessed the Caribbean Peace Movement to be "underdeveloped and immobilised." He stated that although the main function of the peace movement is ostensibly to prevent global thermonuclear war, there is an

. . . inextricable link between the struggle for world peace and the struggle for national liberation. . . . For this last reason, it is my genuine recommendation for us to develop our Grenada Peace Council to a very high and prominent level. Since Grenada leads the struggle in the Eastern Caribbean for national liberation, social progress and economic independence, it behoves of us that we have a dear role to mobilise and put in action the Caribbean peace forces. . . . Trinidad and Tobago . . . is a good starting point . . . so too is Jamaica and Guyana. [Ref. 74:pp. 45.1-5]

Recommendations were to gather diplomatic support within a broad unified front among the islands for Nicaragua, and to hold a meeting of the Caribbean peace movements in April 1983. Support along these lines would be forthcoming from the Soviet Peace Fund, the East Germans, and Cuba.

[Ref. 74:pp. 45.1-5]

The preceding points out the undeniable fact that the NJM placed Grenada in the midst of the Cuban and Soviet strategy in Latin America. The PRG made no bones about its intentions to pursue radical politics both at home and abroad. In a draft response to an article in the SI publication Socialist Affairs, Benny Langaigue, Permanent Secretary in Bishop's office, stated that there was no intention to hold elections in Grenada in 1982, or in "any definitive timeframe" [Ref. 74:p. 42.1]. As early as March 1980, Bishop himself had endorsed the use of the island as a base for leftist forces by saying:

Suppose there is a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance, why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?  
[Ref. 75]

It was this belligerent attitude, and the excessive arms and logistics buildup in the form of the International Airport, that brought about U.S. attention to the island. When the internal power struggle between Bishop and Bernard Coard erupted into violence in the fall of 1983, the U.S.

responded to the request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) by landing a combined U.S.-Caribbean security force on the island on 26 October, 1983.

[Ref. 34:p. 17]

In an interview with Newsweek in January 1984, Castro conceded that the Cubans were at fault for being unaware of the extent of the rift between Bishop and Coard. He claimed that at the time of the coup he had appealed to Coard to be "broad-minded and generous," but that "relations between us and the Coard group were very bad." His analysis was that the death of Bishop had marked the end of the revolution, and that the U.S. invasion had "killed a corpse." He defended the presence of the arms found on the island as "totally proportionate to the size of a small island constantly threatened with invasion from Miami by counterrevolutionary elements." [Ref. 41:p. 39]

Asked if the invasion of Grenada was a serious blow to Cuba's intentions in Latin America, Fidel replied:

Our theory is that the Grenada invasion was a blow to the United States. It was a cowardly and ridiculous act. It won no glory for the United States. It only helped to heighten the fighting spirit of Nicaragua, Cuba and revolutionaries in El Salvador. [Ref. 41:p. 39]

Regardless of the rhetoric, the loss of Grenada was indeed a setback. The Marxist leader of Suriname, Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse, under pressure from Brazil to moderate its pro-Cuban policies, decided that the Coard coup was orchestrated by Cuba. Within hours of the coup he expelled

the Cuban Ambassador, Oscar Oswaldo Cardenas, and suspended all agreements between the two states. These had included health, forestry, fishing, and agricultural projects employing approximately 100 Cuban personnel. There may have been sufficient justification for his fears; Badresein Sital, a radical who opposed Suriname-Brazil rapprochement, had resigned his post in the Bouterse government and was then in Cuba with other radical Surinamese. [Ref. 76] The loss of Grenada and Suriname, both on the easternmost periphery of Latin America, may have thwarted Cuban efforts to forge a geographic link between American and African radical states.

The exposure of the subversive methodology that Cuba and its allies employed in Grenada was brought to the attention of the remaining Caribbean States. Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica and Chairperson of the OECS, linked Cuban with North Korean and Libyan efforts to undermine the islands' relations with Western nations [Ref. 77]. Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica also asserted that there could be no doubt, given the evidence found at the International Airport, that it was to have been exclusively used for hostile activities in the region [Ref. 78]. The most damning evidence of all is the testimony of the Grenadians themselves. In a CBS News poll on 3 November, 1983, 91 percent of them approved the U.S. intervention [Ref. 34:p. 17].

## B. OTHER CARIBBEAN STATES

Cuban relations with the remaining Caribbean States have been inconsistent in quality, and have often hinged upon the personages in power [Ref. 73:pp. 78-80]. Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad/Tobago praised Cuban nationalism and called for the lifting of OAS sanctions against Cuba as early as 1970. But, the islands' energy-based economy with its substantial foreign investment was essentially capitalist in nature, and the success it enjoyed during the oil crisis of the late 1970's thwarted any further movement towards a leftist orientation. [Ref. 79] By 1982, Trinidad/Tobago was a target for the Cuban-Grenadian plan "to mobilize and put in action the Caribbean peace forces."

The Cooperative Socialist Republic of Guyana and its leader, Forbes Burnham, were highly praised in Havana in the 1970's. Burnham supported the Cuban intervention in Angola by allowing Cuban transports to refuel in Guyana on their way to Africa, for which Fidel awarded him the José Martí National Order. But, Burnham's party, the People's National Congress (PNC), had supplanted the more Marxist People's Progressive Party (PPP) with whom the Cubans maintained fraternal links. Hence, Burnham's commitment to socialism was continually in question, and despite some technical and trade agreements, relations with Cuba remained tenuous. [Ref. 73:p. 80]



In August 1978, five Cuban diplomats were expelled for alleged involvement in a major sugar strike. The Guyanese also expressed their displeasure with Cuban violations of a fishing rights agreement. The Soviets and Cubans vainly attempted to ease tensions and to unify the two Marxist parties. [Ref. 14:pp. 70-71] By the early 1980's, however, economic difficulties and internal unrest led to a number of repressive measures by the PNC, and the PPP and the radical Working People's Party were forced underground. [Ref. 73: pp. 80-81; Ref. 80] By 1982, Guyana was also a target for the "peace forces."

Relations with Barbados never amounted to more than minimal contact between the two states. Regularly scheduled flights between Bridgetown and Havana, and the possible presence of a few agricultural technicians appear to be the extent of it. Barbados refused to allow Cuban transports to refuel there during the Angolan intervention. [Ref. 21: pp. 238-39] Of the four islands to establish ties with Cuba in 1972, only Jamaica under Michael Manley became a close ally.

Manley's social democratic government, though not Marxist, was certainly "progressive." [Ref. 81] Cuba provided Jamaica with construction workers to build a secondary school, medical personnel, and condensed milk to alleviate the conditions of the poor. Joint agreements and the exchange of personnel were developed in the fields

of fisheries, agriculture, tourism, and public health. Manley's personal preoccupation with revolutionary politics abroad brought him directly in line with Cuban foreign policy aspirations in the 1970's. Manley unhesitatingly supported the Angolan intervention, for which Castro not only gave him the José Martí National Order, but paid him a personal visit in Kingston in 1977. [Ref. 82]

Manley's close ties with Cuba and his role as Third World spokesman in the Socialist International were not enough to stave off economic disaster and the threat of Cuban subversion at home. The Cuban Ambassador, Ulises Estrada, had served for five years as deputy head of the America's Department, and was previously involved with the Sandinistas. Other members of the large Cuban mission in Kingston were suspected DGI agents. Jamaican construction workers and security personnel trained in Cuba were given political indoctrination, and some received arms training. [Ref. 31]

In May 1980, a Cuban front organization, Moonex International, was discovered to be designated to receive 200,000 shotgun shells and rounds for .38 calibre pistols. When the local manager of Moonex was apprehended fleeing the island, he was in the company of Estrada and the Jamaican Minister of National Security. During the election campaign of 1980, arms (including M-16's and used to attack supporters of Edward Seaga's Jamaican Labor Party) were

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
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believed to be stockpiled at the Cuban Embassy. [Ref. 31] Over 500 Jamaicans were slain in the ensuing violence [Ref. 83:p. 31].

Upon Seaga's election, Estrada was expelled from the country. Jamaican students still in Cuba were recalled. Still, 15 Cubans continued to conduct intelligence operations out of the Embassy. In October 1981, when Cuba refused to release criminals wanted by the Jamaican police, diplomatic relations were completely broken off. [Ref. 31]

After the loss of Manley's pro-Cuban government, the decline in relations with Guyana and Trinidad/Tobago, and the accidental sinking of a Bahamian naval vessel in 1980, Cuba's program of promoting state-to-state relations in the Caribbean came to a standstill [Ref. 73:pp. 78-83]. With the exception of Grenada, Castro was forced once again, as he had in the 60's, to deal with political parties out of power or the radical left. This time, however, he had Soviet assistance.

In 1980, Cuban intelligence officials began making periodic visits to radical groups in the Dominican Republic. In July 1981, the pro-Soviet Dominican Communist Party made public its program to send 100 students each year to universities in the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania. The Soviets began to pressure the Communists to unite with other leftist organizations, while the Cubans provided military training to the Dominican

Liberation Party, the Social Workers Movement, and the Socialist Party. [Ref. 31] Violence erupted in 1984 as a result of state imposed increases in the price of fuel and food. The government of President Salvador Jorge Blanco had to deploy troops in the major cities and close schools to maintain order. [Ref. 84]

Cuba also continues its longstanding involvement with Puerto Rican terrorist groups. According to testimony by Latin American expert Daniel James before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism [Ref. 11:pp. 181-206] the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) was organized by a Puerto Rican-born member of the DGI assigned to the Cuban mission to the United Nations. The agent, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios, organized the group to operate primarily in the United States. The group firebombed three New York department stores in the spring of 1974, and in the fall, bombed the City Hall and Police Headquarters in Newark, New Jersey, Rockefeller Center, and four other places.

After this successful start, Ojeda was transferred to the Americas Department, where he commenced to organize the terrorist groups within Puerto Rico. His first assignment was to organize acts of sabotage during a strike called by the Popular Socialist Party. The leader of that group, Juan Mari Bras, openly admits to ties with Cuba and condones terrorism as a means to gain power. In the 1960's, under

the pseudonym "Alfonso Beal" he had been head of the Armed Commandos of Liberation, which received guerrilla training in Cuba as part of the Venceremos brigade. The group subsequently bombed U.S. companies in Puerto Rico, as well as a U.S. Governor's Conference, killed one U.S. marine, and sabotaged five helicopters. [Ref. 11:pp. 181-206]

Ojeda then met with other terrorist leaders, and reported back to Cuba that the time for armed struggle in Puerto Rico was at hand. In 1976 he organized the Revolutionary Commandos of the People (CRP) to conduct urban guerrilla warfare, and then traveled to Paris to meet with "Carlos the Jackal," the PLO, and an East German intelligence agent. He also met with the Dominican Resistance (RD) (the principal terrorist group) to coordinate activities. In 1976, Puerto Rican police interrogated three RD members, who admitted receiving PLO training and acting in concert with the Puerto Rican groups. [Ref. 11:pp. 201-02]

In 1976, after a crushing defeat of the Popular Socialist Party in the gubernatorial race, approximately 600 members who had received Cuban training defected and turned to violent confrontation. A number of terrorist organizations subsequently emerged. The first was the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP), who engaged in bank robbery and armed attacks on places frequented by U.S. Navy personnel assigned to Roosevelt Roads. [Ref. 11:pp. 201-04]

Soon after, the Boricua Popular Army (EPB), better known as *Los Macheteros*, began operations. At least 11 of their members had received training from the Chilean MIR during the Allende years, and later at a camp in Cuba. Their first publicly-acknowledged action, in August 1978, was the murder of a Puerto Rican policeman. Then, in December 1979, they ambushed a U.S. Navy bus in Sabana Seca, killing two petty officers and wounding 10 others. The FARP and the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP) assisted in the attack. The terrorists used a Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle, of probable Czechoslovakian origin. In January 1981, the same three groups firebombed nine Air National Guard jets worth \$45 million at Isla Verde Air Base. In July 1981, *Los Macheteros* struck again, destroying three Federal Aviation Administration navigational stations and a Coast Guard navigational beacon, disrupting air traffic between the U.S. and the Caribbean. [Ref. 11:pp. 201-04]

James testified that between 1975 and 1981 Puerto Rican terrorists committed 260 violent acts at home, and another 100 in the United States. He claimed that the five main groups (the CRP, the FARP, the OVRP, *Los Macheteros*, and the FALN) were unified by Ojeda under a Joint Operations Command. This group, in turn, comes under a Coordinating Revolutionary Junta run by the DGI and the Americas Department. [Ref. 11:pp. 203-04]



Certainly, the sophisticated tactics of the groups indicate a high degree of training and discipline. James testified that he personally witnessed a videotape, produced for publicity purposes, of the preparations for the Isla Verde firebombing. The operation itself supposedly only took seven minutes, 40 seconds. [Ref. 11:p. 203] The Puerto Rican scenario lends itself perfectly to joint action by the DGI, with its Soviet backing for anti-U.S. operations, and the Americas Department, with its emphasis on Latin American revolution. The implication is that as a Latin American State pulls closer to Washington, it comes under more direct attack by the Soviets, through their DGI mentors.

After Grenada, most of the remaining Caribbean islands became painfully aware of the pitfalls involved with close ties to Cuba and/or the Soviets. Still the islands face a continuing economic and developmental crisis. Increased petroleum costs, price drops on the world market for commodity exports, huge foreign debts to cover trade deficits, and even "stagflation" in the United States, contribute to a worsening situation. What little income salvaged is inequitably distributed. While Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative of 1982 is meant to address these problems, according to H. Michael Erisman [Ref. 83:pp. 11-16], it falls short of an ideal solution.

The provision of allowing Caribbean exports to enter the United States duty-free, is already covered in the Generalized System of Preferences, which already gives 87 percent of the same goods duty-free status. As a net result, Reagan's plan covers only eight percent of products exported to the United States. [Ref. 85] The CBI also counts heavily on private investment, which must be matched with government aid to help the islands develop the logistic infrastructure needed to support new industries. The Cubans have claimed that the growth of U.S. investment and the free-trade proviso profits only the investors.

Given the fact of overwhelming domination by the Yankee transnationalists over the production and even more over the marketing of the export products of the underdeveloped countries, "duty-free entry" is shown to be a gimmick which in no way alters the control of the companies. On the contrary, they make even more profits, and the structural relations between imperialism and the underdeveloped countries which are the root cause of poverty and backwardness remain untouched" [Ref. 86]

Erisman also believes that Reagan's "trickle-down" theory of economic recovery is unlikely to hold in the Caribbean, given the existing patterns of unequal distribution. Distributive reform is likely to mean that the Washington-supported oligarchy must sacrifice some of its holdings. [Ref. 83:pp. 15-16] This is a difficult task, but the success of land reform in El Salvador proves it is not impossible.

Though the Cubans may have been thwarted in their notion of making the Caribbean into a model of socialist

development, by no means can we be assured that they have completely lost hope of accomplishing this task. As long as the Reagan administration combines tough rhetoric with economic reform, they will be unable to exert much, if any, influence on existing state powers. Cuban strategy through the remainder of the decade is likely to center on criticism of the CBI in the international forum, aggravation of class incompatibility through agitation of leftist parties, and low level terror directed towards U.S. citizens and companies in order to discourage investment.

## V. CONCLUSION

It appears that the Cuban military offensive in Latin America may now be at a standstill. Evidence of Cuban operations in both Central America and the Caribbean has been meager and inconclusive since the fall of the Marxist-Leninist government in Grenada. Robert Leiken, expert on Soviet and Cuban involvement in Latin America, has even gone so far as to say that the offensive was over by 1980 [Ref. 87:p. 211]. Just as Fidel backed off in 1967 to save his country from economic ruin, he has been forced to retreat in the face of a much greater danger -- namely, the perceived threat of a U.S. military intervention in Cuba.

To ensure that this does not occur, it is extremely important for the Cubans to divorce themselves from the East-West conflict. This can only be done by convincing the United States that Cuba is not a Soviet proxy. Fidel is well-aware that the Soviets would not risk a global conflict over his island, and, though a U.S. invasion would be costly for both sides, there can be no doubt as to its outcome. Additionally, he must downplay the image of Cuba as a part of a global terrorist network, as alleged by President Reagan on July 8, 1985 [Ref. 88]. Fidel's response to this charge, calling Reagan "a madman, an imbecile, a bum" [Ref. 89], is part of an attempt to discredit the allegations,

which did not include any recent evidence of Cuban terrorism. The current move by other Third World States, including Nicaragua, to make counter-accusations of U.S. terrorism helps to shift the focus of western criticism away from Cuba.

On the other hand, other Latin American terrorists who have received training in Cuba have no such imperative to curtail their activities. The spring of 1985 has marked a new wave of urban terror in San Salvador, with an estimated 500 rebels involved in hit-and-run raids, assassinations, and kidnappings [Ref. 90]. Nicaragua has been accused of harboring not only Latin American terrorists, but also members of Italy's Red Brigades, West Germany's Baader-Meinhof gang, the Basque ETA, the PLO, and the Irish Republican Army [Ref. 88]. High ranking Nicaraguan officials, including Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra, have been implicated in drug smuggling. The operations were started with official Cuban assistance, utilizing ties to Colombia and Bolivia, and, according to a Sandinist defector, were meant to produce:

. . . a good economic benefit, which we needed for our revolution. We wanted to provide food for our people with the suffering and death of the youth of the United States. [Ref. 91]

So long as it goes on, Cuba will continue to be accused, and rightfully so, of terrorist activities. Just as the Soviets found it difficult to control Fidel in the 1960's,

Fidel finds it even more difficult to control the activities of the Sandinistas and other Latin Americans dedicated to terrorism. It appears the Ortega government has its own motivations in pursuing destabilization in its bordering states, not the least of which could be a Soviet mandate.

In conjunction with downplaying military and terrorist operations, Fidel is now pursuing a diplomatic and economic strategy in the region. This includes the maintenance of the "liberation theology" movement, the pursuit of an anti-U.S. Contadora process, and an economic policy aimed at the destruction of Western influence in the region.

"Liberation theology" was declared an option at the 1975 Havana Conference. It was noted that:

The dialogue between believers and Marxists is facilitating the advance of unity in action in the struggle for deep transformations against imperialism and the fascist threat and lays the foundation for a lasting alliance which will lead to the building of a new society. [Ref. 92]

The success of this tack was clearly evident during the Sandinist revolution, and Cuba quickly assimilated it into its own strategy. Though churches were never officially banned in Cuba, close religious affiliations had been detrimental to an individual status in Cuban society. Now, however, the government is taking steps to restore long neglected churches and synagogues, and Fidel has even invited a visit by Pope John Paul II [Ref. 93]. During their period of influence in Grenada, the Cubans attempted

to forge links between radical Latin churches in Central America and the English-speaking churches in the Caribbean. Though this never came to fruition, the movement has been extremely successful in generating anti-interventionist support from clergy members and laity in the United States. Despite official Vatican censure, both the Sandinistas and the Cubans continue to rely heavily on this tactic.

The Contadora initiative has brought a softening of Cuban revolutionary rhetoric in the hopes that a negotiated solution will leave Nicaraguan forces in a strategically advantageous position. Fidel is relying on his personal friendships with President Betancur of Colombia, and President de la Madrid of Mexico, to ensure that a regional solution is not explicitly anti-Cuban in nature. In conjunction with this, Fidel has repeatedly denied the Cuban ability to export revolution, and claims to support dialogue between the Duarte government and the Salvadoran guerrillas [Ref. 94].

If the Contadora Initiative turns out as Fidel hopes, that is, with an unconditional U.S. withdrawal and the Marxist forces still intact, then economic chaos in the region would assure the long-awaited Latin American revolution. Fidel is now urging Latin American nations to renege on their \$360 billion debt to Western, primarily U.S., banks. Such a move might not only create financial havoc in the United States, it would also deter private

investment in the region and stop Reagan's Caribbean Initiative dead in its tracks. Though none of the Latin American nations have taken the advice to heart, Fidel may enjoy a resurgence of popularity among pro-Soviet labor unions, who also have called for repudiation of the debt. Not surprisingly, the concept does not apply to Cuba itself. The Cuban government has shown no intention of cancelling its own hard currency debt of over \$3.3 billion. Fidel has hinted at austerity measures at home and is turning to tourist trade in hopes of generating about \$250 million in revenue this year. [Ref. 1:p.2; Ref. 95; Ref. 96]

This economic offensive may also be designed to mollify the Soviets, who may be dissatisfied with Fidel's current hesitance to pursue a more active military role in the region. The Soviets undoubtedly would prefer that both Cuba and Nicaragua continue anti-U.S. activities in the region. With a finite amount of Soviet aid at stake, this may have inadvertently launched the two states into a competition to prove to Moscow their respective strategic importance. By Nicaragua assuming the subversive role on the mainland, and Cuba exploring diplomatic and economic options, the two can work hand-in-hand to satisfy the Soviet desire to exert pressure on the U.S. strategic rear.

With continued Soviet help, Fidel can afford to wait out the current wave of anti-Cuban rhetoric. Even if he should die or leave office before conditions change, it



would make little difference in Cuban policy abroad. He will probably be succeeded by his brother Raul, Carlos Rodriguez, or Ramiro Valdez -- all of whom have proven their worth to Moscow. No matter who the successor may be, the Soviets are not likely to relinquish control of the island, and will to continue to utilize it and its residents to aggravate U.S. interests in the region.

Finally, it must be reiterated that the Cuban situation is a result of over a century of anti-imperialist sentiment. Though most Latin and Caribbean States are currently wary of the Cubans, the common racial and cultural heritage they share with them is by far the greatest asset in the Cuban arsenal. Cuba has been, and will continue to be, a willing participant in the move to create revolution in Latin America. The Cubans place great emphasis on the education and political indoctrination of their young, and a whole generation has been raised under communism. Even if Cuba should absolve itself of all Soviet influence, the basic tenets of its ideology would not change. When more favorable conditions prevail, the Cuban revolutionary offensive will be renewed with vigor. It is imperative that during this lull the remaining Latin American and Caribbean states be presented with realistic options to ensure the survival of pluralistic democracies, and thus to provide for hemispherical security as a whole.

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APPENDIX A: CUBAN ORDER OF BATTLE

TABLE 1: CUBAN GROUND FORCES INVENTORY

Equipment Item (Est. Numbers)	Function
<i>Tanks (950)</i>	
T-62 (150)	Modern main battle tank (medium); since 1976
T-54/55 (350)	Main battle tank (medium)
T-34 (350)	Main battle tank (medium); obsolete
IS-2 (60)	Heavy tank; obsolete
PT-76 (40)	Reconnaissance, light tank
<i>Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles (150)</i>	
BRDM/BRDM-2	Command reconnaissance
BRDM-2 w/ AT-3 Sagger missile	Antitank reconnaissance; since 1975
<i>Assault Gun</i>	
SU-100 (100)	Assault
<i>Armored Personnel Carriers (500)</i>	
BTR-40/-60/-152 (400)	Not amphibious
BMP (100)	Amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle; since 1979
<i>Anti-Armor Weapons</i>	
M-1943 57mm guns	
57mm RCL	
Sagger ATGW	
Snapper ATGW	

TABLE 1 (continued)

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Equipment Item

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*Artillery and SSM's (1200)*

M1942 76mm, 85mm  
BM-21 122mm  
M-46 130mm  
BM-14 140mm  
D1, D2, ML-20 152mm  
BM-24 240mm MRL  
FROG-4/-7 SSM (65)  
M-43 120mm mortar

*Anti-Air Weapons (1500)*

ZU-23  
37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm towed  
23mm ZU-23  
ZSU-23-4 23mm  
30mm M53 (twin)/BTR-60P  
ZSU-57 57mm SP  
SA-7/-9 SAM

Sources: The Military Balance 1984/85, pp. 119-20, 1984; and Bainwoll, Mitchell, "Cuba," in Fighting Armies: Nonaligned, Third World, and other Ground Armies: A Combat Assessment, Richard A. Gabriel, pp. 229-20, Greenwood Press, 1983.

TABLE 2: CUBAN NAVAL FORCES INVENTORY

Platform (Est. Numbers)	Mission
<i>Submarines (4)</i>	
FOXTROT (3)	Attack and Reconnaissance
WHISKEY (1)	Non-operational, Training and/or battery charging
<i>Frigates (2)</i>	
KONI w/ SA-N-4 SAM and RBU-6000	ASW
<i>Patrol Craft (41)</i>	
KROHNSTADT (2)	ASW
S.O.-1 (9)	ASW
ZHUK (22)	Coastal Patrol
<i>Guided Missile Patrol Craft (26)</i>	
OSA II w/ 4 SS-N-2 (13)	Anti-ship
OSA I w/ 4 SS-N-2 (5)	Anti-ship
KOMAR w/ 2 SS-N-2 (8)	Anti-ship
<i>Torpedo Boats</i>	
TURYA Semi-hydrofoils (8)	Anti-ship/ASW
P-6 (6)	Anti-ship/ASW
P-4 (12)	Anti-ship/ASW
<i>Minesweepers</i>	
SONYA (2)	
YEVGENYA (10)	
<i>Amphibians (9)</i>	
POLOCNY B (2)	Medium assault landing
T-4 (7)	Utility lighters

TABLE 2 (continued)

Platform	Mission
<i>Hydrographic Survey (8)</i>	
BIYA (1)	Survey, buoy tender
NYRYAT-1 (6)	Diving tenders
<i>Auxilliaries</i>	
PELYM (1)	Degaussing
Converted trawler (1)	Intelligence collection
OKHTENSKIY (1)	Seagoing tug
YELVA (2)	Diving tenders
<i>Coast Guard craft</i>	
40-foot small craft (4)	
70-foot small craft (3)	
Patrol craft (1)	
Fast launches (6)	
<i>Coastal Defense Batteries</i>	
M-1931/37 122mm guns	
M-1937 152mm guns	
SM-4-1 130mm guns	
Samlet SSM (50)	

Sources: The Military Balance: 1984/85, pp. 119-20, 1984;  
and Combat Fleets of the World: 1984/85: Their Ships,  
Aircraft, and Armament, Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., pp.  
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TABLE 3: CUBAN AIR FORCES INVENTORY

*Ground Attack (51)*

MiG-17 (15)  
MiG-23BN Flogger F (36)

*Interceptors (199)*

MiG-21F (30)  
MiG-23 Flogger E (15)  
MiG-21PFM (34)  
MiG-21PFMA (20)  
MiG-21bis (100)

*Transports (94)*

Il-14 (16)  
An-2 (35)  
An-24 (3)  
An-26 (22)  
Yak-10 (4)  
Il-62 (9)  
Tu-154 (4)

*Helicopters (118)*

Mi-4 (60)  
Mi-8 (40)  
Mi-24 Hind D (18)

*Anti-Air Weapons*

*Trainers*

MiG-23U (2)  
MiG-21U (10)  
Zlin 326 (30)  
An-2  
L-39

*SAM Launchers (30)*

28 w/ SA-2 (60), SA-3 (140)  
2 w/ SA-6 (12)

AA-1 Alkali  
AA-2 Atoll  
AA-8 Aphid

Source: The Military Balance: 1984-85, pp. 119-20, 1984.

TABLE 4: CUBANS UNDER ARMS.

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Total Active Duty	161,500
Army	130,000
Navy	13,000
Air Force	18,500
Army Reserve	135,000
Paramilitary	1,130,000
Youth Labor Army	+100,000
Civil Defense Force	+100,000
Territorial Troop Militia	+500,000
Border Guard Troops	+3,000
National Revolutionary Police	+10,000
(Civilian Auxilliaries)	+52,000
Department of State Security	10,000-15,000

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Billboard, Armed Forces Information Service, November 1984; and U.S. Department of State, Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 103, August 1982.

APPENDIX B: CUBAN PERSONNEL ABROAD

Country	Military Advisors	Contract Personnel	Civilians
Algeria		100-150	
Angola	30,000	5,000	
Benin			30
Burundi			14
Cape Verde	12		10
Congo	400		100-200
Czechoslovakia		4,000	
Ethiopia	5,000	600-800	
East Germany		4,000	
Guinea			50-100
Guyana	30		
Iraq		1,000	
Kampuchea			20
Laos			100
Libya		2,500	
Mali			6
Mozambique	700		600-700
Nicaragua	2,500-3,500		6,000
Sao Tome			50-100
Seychelles			6


APPENDIX B (continued)

	Military Advisors	Contract Personnel	Civilians
South Yemen	500		100
Tanzania			50-60
Vietnam			300

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Billboard, Armed Forces Information Service, November 1984.




APPENDIX C: USSR ARMS TRANSFERS TO CUBA



Source: U.S., Department of State and Department of Defense, The Soviet/Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, p. 9, March 1985.

# APPENDIX D: PERCEPTION OF CUBA



Source: U.S., Department of State and Department of Defense, The Soviet/Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, p. 37, March 1985.

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